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7Abstract
I. Abstract
Our findings lead to two main conclusions. First, 
regional cooperation efforts should continue, 
but more effort should be focused on securing 
the maximum possible level of economic 
integration with the EU. Second, economic 
development and EU accession in the region are 
severely hamstrung by territorial disputes and 
constitutional deadlock. Without a breakthrough 
on these issues – and especially the normalisation 
of relations between Serbia and Kosovo – no 
amount of regional cooperation initiatives can 
fundamentally change the situation. 
This study evaluates the success of the EU’s 
strategy of regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans over the last two decades from an 
economic perspective. 
First, we define the prerequisites for successful 
regional cooperation in an institutional, political 
and economic sense, and assess the extent to 
which they existed in the Western Balkans at 
the start of the 2000s. Second, we identify the 
key facets of the EU’s strategy to deepen trade, 
investment and infrastructure connectivity in the 
Western Balkans, and establish the impact that 
this has had. Third, we assess the state of play in 
2020, and make some suggestions for the way 
forward. 
Our main findings are a) that many of the most 
important prerequisites for regional cooperation 
have not existed in the Western Balkans during 
the past two decades, and that the potential gains 
from the EU strategy have therefore always been 
quite limited; b) that regional trade, investment 
and infrastructure integration has increased 
somewhat, but that there are still many gaps and 
challenges ahead; and c) that these efforts have 
not fundamentally altered the main obstacles 
to normalising political relations in the Western 
Balkans and, ultimately, to the EU accession of its 
constituent countries. 
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II. Key findings
have bilateral disputes with other Western 
Balkan countries have had fewer incentives 
to engage in the process, which has helped to 
foster a persistent tension between regional 
cooperation and the bilateral accession 
process with Brussels. Serbia’s size relative 
to all other countries involved in regional 
cooperation – particularly after Croatia 
joined the EU in 2013 – has also been a 
complicating factor. There has not been a 
single outside threat that could have spurred 
the Western Balkan elites to become more 
thoroughly committed to and engaged in 
regional cooperation. 
4.  The economic fundamentals of the 
region in the early 2000s added to the 
hurdles currently facing the EU’s regional 
cooperation strategy. Some supportive 
factors did exist. At least before 2008, 
growth in the EU and global economies was 
strong, providing a supportive backdrop, 
while the Western Balkan countries had 
different comparative advantages, meaning 
that, in theory, there was a complementarity 
in production structures. However, even 
taking into account the disruption to regional 
trade caused by the wars of the 1990s, 
the potential upside to regional economic 
integration – for both trade and investment 
– was not very high. All countries were poor 
and, with the partial exception of Serbia, 
very small, which further limited the feasible 
gains from increased regional economic 
1.  This study set out to answer the question 
of whether the EU strategy of regional 
cooperation has produced concrete results 
in terms of economic connectivity and rising 
living standards, and whether this in turn has 
had a positive impact on the normalisation 
of political relations in and progress towards 
EU accession of the Western Balkans. In 
reassessing the various initiatives and 
outlining the state of play in 2020, it has also 
sought to form a basis for thinking about the 
areas in which the efforts of regional and EU 
policymakers can be best directed in the next 
decade.
2.  Many of the institutional underpinnings 
necessary for effective regional cooperation 
have not existed in the Western Balkans 
during the past 20 years. Granted, the EU 
and US have acted as important outside 
forces driving the process, and local 
ownership has gradually strengthened over 
the period. However, territorial issues remain 
outstanding, many local elites have never 
‘bought into’ the process, and institutional 
and governance standards generally remain 
low across the region. Together, these factors 
have created significant hurdles to the 
success of regional cooperation.
3.  We establish that the political incentives 
required for effective regional cooperation 
have not always been aligned. Countries that 
are more economically advanced or do not 
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Western Balkan countries, CEFTA has had 
an important positive impact in terms of 
increasing competitiveness, rebuilding the 
regional market, and increasing the flow of 
goods, all of which would otherwise not have 
been possible. 
8.  Regarding investment, we have generally 
found less impressive outcomes. The 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between 
Western Balkan countries, which started 
in the late 1990s, have not produced any 
statistically significant results. One of the 
key reasons for this has been the generally 
low institutional standards in the region. 
If this were not the case, we believe that 
higher intraregional investment would have 
materialised. 
9.  The Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs) signed by the Western 
Balkan countries have had a positive impact 
on integration with the EU. Exports have 
increased by 24.6 percent as a result of 
the SAAs, while the inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) stock from the EU has 
risen by 46.2 percent. However, the Western 
Balkan countries have not been able to 
attract the same value of FDI from Western 
Europe as the Visegrad countries, the original 
CEFTA members, have. With very few 
exceptions (e.g. Fiat-Chrysler in Serbia), large 
Western multinational investors have been 
notable for their absence in the Western 
Balkans, which stands in stark contrast to 
their presence in the Visegrad countries. 
10.  Our study establishes that the EU strategy 
regarding infrastructure, combined with 
the initiatives of other actors, has produced 
some positive outcomes. The Western 
Balkan countries have been integrated into 
the Trans-European Transport Networks 
(TEN-T) and Trans-European Networks 
for Energy (TEN-E). Since 2013, transport 
integration. Non-tariff barriers to trade 
and weak connectivity were also major 
obstacles. A genuine leap forward in terms 
of regional economic integration would have 
also required significant policy coordination, 
which is something that never materialised. 
5.  The material institutional, political and 
economic barriers to the EU’s regional 
cooperation strategy have meant that 
Brussels would necessarily have to offer 
major incentives to the Western Balkan 
countries in order for the plan to work. A 
multitude of initiatives in trade, investment 
and infrastructure have been launched.
6.  We establish that the bilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) signed between Western 
Balkan countries beginning in 2002 have 
had a positive impact on intraregional trade. 
However, we measure the positive impact 
of these FTAs on regional exports at 13.9 
percent, which is only around half of the 
positive impact that an FTA has on trade 
between two signatories on average. Our 
results were significantly affected by Serbia, 
which has notably expanded its trade with 
the EU over this period. Excluding Serbia, 
we found that the positive impact of FTAs 
between the other five Western Balkan Six 
countries was a much more impressive 70 
percent. 
7.  We find that the introduction of the ‘new’ 
Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA) in 2007 has been more successful 
than the FTAs for the Western Balkans as 
a whole, and has increased intraregional 
trade by 37.7 percent. Again, we find that 
Serbia is a notable outlier, which reflects its 
increased economic integration with the EU. 
As for the FTAs, when we remove Serbia from 
the sample, we establish a strongly positive 
impact of CEFTA on intraregional trade, 
of around 70 percent. For the five smaller 
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economic development and convergence, 
nor has it had any material impact on 
breaking the most intractable aspects of 
the ‘geography of animosity’. It remains 
the case that the political incentives for 
elites to engage fully in the process do not 
exist, and that institutional and governance 
weaknesses remain an impediment to 
effective regional cooperation. No matter 
how much work is done to advance regional 
economic integration, the fact remains that 
the countries are mostly small and quite poor, 
so the potential gains are necessarily limited. 
The negative demographic trends in evidence 
across the region indicate a lack of hope 
among younger educated people, and bear 
testament to the generally disappointing 
outcomes of the last 20 years. 
14.  While regional cooperation should certainly 
continue, it would make sense to focus 
efforts on the maximum level of economic 
integration possible with the EU. Greater 
access to the EU budget could have a 
material impact on the Western Balkan 
economies, while the increased contributions 
this would require would barely register in 
the budgets of net contributor states in the 
EU. Additional steps for consideration could 
include joining the EU Customs Union and 
expanding the existing SAAs. Even if full 
EU accession is many years away, steps to 
integrate the Western Balkans more fully 
into the bloc should be considered in the 
meantime. The Western Balkans constitute 
less than 1 percent of the EU’s GDP; even a 
moderate increase in economic integration 
and access to financing could have significant 
economic spillovers. Demographic trends and 
the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic add an extra 
element of urgency to these deliberations.  
15.  Ultimately, economics can only provide part 
of the answer to how to advance regional 
integration, the normalisation of relations, 
infrastructure investment in the Western 
Balkans has generally been higher than for 
the EU members in Southeast Europe (SEE). 
In most countries, there has been a decline in 
the number of firms reporting transport and 
energy infrastructure as a major constraint. 
11.  However, we also identify many gaps 
and challenges ahead for infrastructure 
development and connectivity in the 
Western Balkans. Motorway and railway 
densities are low, existing transport 
infrastructure is of poor quality, electricity 
outages and loss are a serious issue in some 
countries, and ICT infrastructure is poorly 
developed. Challenges to improving these 
shortcomings include financing constraints, 
corruption and regulatory deficiencies. 
Therefore, despite the major efforts of the 
EU and other partners over the past two 
decades, the standards of transport, energy 
and ICT infrastructure have generally lagged 
behind those of regional peers, which in 
turn has hindered regional connectivity and 
economic convergence. 
12.  Taking stock of the state of play in 2020, we 
observe many positive aspects of regional 
cooperation. We highlight the increased 
local ownership of the past decade and 
survey data showing that citizens are highly 
supportive of and engaged in regional 
cooperation efforts. There are a multitude 
of initiatives, and a great deal of important 
work is being done. Further efforts led by 
the Regional Cooperation Council towards 
developing a Regional Economic Area are 
welcome. 
13.  However, taking into account what the EU 
originally set out to achieve over the past 
two decades, we highlight many reasons 
for being disappointed. The increased trade, 
investment and infrastructure integration 
has not had a strongly positive impact on 
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and the EU accession of the Western Balkan 
countries. Serbia stands at the heart of the 
‘geography of animosity’, yet its incentives 
to fully engage in regional cooperation are 
limited, with the current situation allowing 
it to extract concessions from all sides while 
not having to formally renounce its territorial 
claims on Kosovo. We have shown that Serbia 
has integrated quite successfully into EU 
value chains, while it has also maintained and 
intensified important strategic relationships 
with Russia and China. The EU is likely going 
to have to make a specific proposal to Serbia 
if it wishes to advance the EU accession 
process. Until that point, it is likely that only 
North Macedonia and Montenegro – neither 
of which is really involved in the ‘geography 
of animosity’ – will have a feasible path 
towards EU accession anytime soon. 
16.  This study was written during a time of 
increasing despondency about the EU 
accession prospects of the Western Balkan 
countries, rapid outward migration from the 
region, the re-emergence of the dangerous 
idea of territorial swaps, and the outbreak of 
the Covid-19 crisis. In addition to underlining 
the urgency of the situation, all of this 
emphasises the need for more imaginative 
solutions for enhancing the EU accession 
prospects of the countries in the Western 
Balkans.
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•  This convergence, in turn, would lead to 
a greater readiness to peacefully resolve 
political conflicts.
Aside from resolving political conflicts, regional 
cooperation was seen as a way to prepare the 
region economically for EU accession, as restated 
in the EU strategy for the Western Balkans 
(European Commission 2018). 
Regional cooperation: An idea with 
deep historical roots
The idea that countries which are more 
economically integrated are less likely to go to 
war goes back at least as far as Plutarch. The 
liberal idea rests on two assumptions: 1) trade 
brings people into more contact with each other 
(and, therefore, they are less likely to fight); and 
2) trade increases the prosperity and power 
of the productive and peaceful members of a 
society. Later, a similar idea formed a key part 
of Kant’s theory of perpetual peace, which 
stipulates that economic interdependence makes 
accommodation more attractive than war. Adam 
Smith developed these ideas further with his 
dismantling of the theory of mercantilism in The 
Wealth of Nations. 
Especially in Europe, this old theory has two 
more modern and highly successful examples in 
practice: the process of post-Second World War 
reconciliation, and the economic integration 
of France and Germany. Starting in the late 
Regional cooperation has been a key part of the 
EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans for 
well over two decades.1 This has especially been 
the case since the end of the Kosovo War in 1999. 
In this sense, the Western Balkans countries’ EU 
accession process has been somewhat different 
from that of the 10 other formerly communist 
countries that joined the EU between 2004 and 
2007. For those countries, regional cooperation 
was encouraged, but not required.2 By contrast, 
in addition to their bilateral accession process 
with Brussels, the Western Balkan countries have 
also had to achieve benchmarks in terms of their 
mutual relations. 
Most of Western Europe did not want to let the 
Western Balkan countries into the EU until the 
various conflicts in the region had been resolved. 
They therefore formulated the strategy of 
regional cooperation, which was based on the 
following assumptions:
•  Intensifying economic contact would lead to 
better economic outcomes.
•  Better economic outcomes would lead to a 
convergence of economic interests.
1 This paper largely deals with the so-called ‘Western Balkan 
Six’: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, 
North Macedonia and Serbia. However, since Croatia was 
also part of the regional cooperation process until its EU 
accession in 2013, it will also be considered here whenever 
relevant, and context will inform the reader whether 
references to the ‘Western Balkans’ also include Croatia.
2 For example, with the Visegrad countries and the original 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
III. Introduction 
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and Herzegovina – have not been resolved. 
Indeed, ethnonationalism – or at least its 
instrumentalization by politicians – remains a 
rather strong factor in the region’s politics. 
The key conflicts of the Western Balkans over  
the last century or so have been between Serbs 
and Croats, and the comparison with Franco-
German conflicts is useful in this case. Rather 
than in the European way, the Serbo-Croat 
conflict was resolved by accepting Croatia into 
the EU while leaving Serbia to play the dominant 
role within the Western Balkan region. That has 
transformed the geography of animosity from a 
Serbo-Croat conflict into one in which Serbia has 
territorial issues with most of the other countries 
in the region, albeit to rather different degrees. 
This all makes for a very lopsided regional 
distribution of power. Serbia’s neighbours 
are significantly weaker than it by almost any 
measure, including population size, military 
power and fiscal resources. As a result, it is very 
difficult for a regional equilibrium to emerge.
As was feared at the start of the process, the 
geography of animosity contributes to and, in 
some ways, reinforces the economic weaknesses 
of the region. Political antagonisms have 
consumed a great deal of time and drawn focus 
away from progress on economic and social 
development. On top of that, there are also 
‘frozen’ or ‘semi-frozen’ conflicts. In general, 
‘frozen’ conflicts limit or constrain the level and 
form of overall connectivity across parties to a 
conflict and with the outside world.
There is a key difference between postwar 
Western Europe and the Western Balkans of the 
2000s. While the European integration process 
in the postwar decades was a broad enough 
framework to permanently put aside the Franco-
German conflict and, indeed, to encourage their 
cooperation in jointly leading the EU, this has not 
been the case for the Western Balkans. The latter 
region has simply not been a sufficiently broad 
framework for settling regional conflicts. To do 
1940s, after having fought three devastating 
wars in less than a century, France and Germany 
have pursued a course of ever-closer economic 
integration, which initially started with the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
is still ongoing. 
Over this period, war between the two countries 
has become unthinkable. Although the real 
reasons for the lack of armed conflict between 
them may have more to do with the nuclear 
deterrent and the US security role in Europe, 
there is a widespread perception that it is due to 
economic and political integration under the EU 
umbrella. This perception has framed a lot of the 
thinking in Brussels, Berlin and elsewhere about 
regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. 
Moreover, economic regional cooperation as a 
structural means of resolving conflicts has also 
been a natural route for the EU to pursue since it 
does not have a security arm of any consequence. 
Kant’s thinking on this – specifically the 
importance of the rule of law and open markets 
to post-conflict political union – have played an 
important role in the justification of postwar 
European integration. What’s more, it has also 
inspired the process of EU enlargement to help to 
transform formerly fascist and formerly socialist 
countries.
The ‘geography of animosity’ 
To say that the application of this idea has been 
less successful in the Western Balkans in the past 
two decades than in Western Europe since 1945 
is hardly controversial. Three decades since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and two decades after the 
wars in the region ended, parts of the former 
Yugoslavia are still defined by the ‘geography 
of animosity’ (Gligorov 2008). Gligorov used 
this term to describe unresolved territorial 
and constitutional issues. Although there have 
been many positive developments in the region, 
the key political conflicts – particularly those 
between Serbia and Kosovo and within Bosnia 
14
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This weak economic performance has contributed 
to – and been reinforced by – a huge brain  
drain from the region. Between 2000 and 
2019, the populations of Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina decreased by over 7 percent, 
and of Albania by more than 6 percent. Around 
half of Bosnians already live abroad. According 
to a recent study by the Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies (wiiw), between 
now and 2050, the working-age population of all 
Western Balkan countries will shrink by between 
17 percent in Montenegro to around a third in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mara 2020).3 These 
figures point to the limited prospects and lack 
of hope regarding the future among much of the 
region’s population. 
3 NB: Kosovo was not included in this study.
so, it would need a European framework rather 
than the regional one. This tension between 
the European perspective and the condition of 
regional cooperation has proved persistent. 
Two lost decades for the region’s 
economies
Almost without exception, the Western Balkan 
countries have recorded the worst rates of 
economic convergence with Germany over the 
past 20 years in the whole of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE; see Figure III.1). This is despite the 
fact that, in 2000, most of the Western Balkan 
countries were much poorer than even Bulgaria 
and Romania, and that, all else being equal, poor 
countries tend to grow faster than rich ones.
Percentage change in real per capita GDP v Germany, 2000–2018 (left scale)
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FIGURE III.1  Convergence performance versus Germany, 2000–2018
Sources: Eurostat, wiiw.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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includes a staged process and reversibility 
(French Government 2019). 
Plenty of other countries have at least 
some sympathy for the French position. The 
Netherlands4 and Denmark are also sceptical 
about accession for Albania specifically. But 
there appears to be growing opposition to 
enlargement across Western Europe more 
broadly. The experience of Bulgarian accession 
in 2007, in particular, left many in Western 
Europe feeling that more could have been done 
in the pre-accession period to strengthen the 
rule of law in the country. Thirteen years on, 
Bulgaria and Romania are still under special 
monitoring in the fields of corruption, judicial 
reform and organised crime. 
4 The Netherlands has a particular issue with Albania. In fact, 
the Dutch government asked the European Commission to 
suspend visa-free travel for Albanians in early June 2019 
owing to concerns about organised crime.
Is EU accession still even possible?
Meanwhile, the EU accession process is dragging 
on for the region, but at a very slow pace. Even 
for Serbia and Montenegro, which started EU 
accession negotiations some time ago, full 
membership is still many years off (Grieveson, 
Grübler and Holzner 2018). At best, they will join 
the EU two decades after Romania and Bulgaria, 
their fellow CEE countries, did. In fact, it will most 
likely be significantly longer than that, although 
after several challenging years, North Macedonia 
and Albania are at least now able to start 
accession talks (European Commission 2020b).
France has been the most important country 
when it comes to delaying the start of accession 
talks for North Macedonia and Albania. French 
President Emmanuel Macron would prefer to 
first focus on reforming the EU before accepting 
any new members. In 2019, France published 
a short ‘non-paper’ laying out its demand for 
a reform of the enlargement process, which 
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of thought among centrist politicians on how 
to protect and strengthen the EU. The decision 
pushed most vigorously by French President 
Emmanuel Macron is that it is better to press 
ahead with integration (as the Eurobarometer 
survey shows) rather than to further enlarge the 
EU, but also to keep integration quite shallow in 
plenty of areas. 
In March 2020, the European Council agreed 
to start accession talks with Albania and 
North Macedonia (European Council 2020). It 
stipulated, however, that Albania must first make 
progress in a number of areas, including electoral 
and judicial reform as well as actions related 
to organised crime. The Council also endorsed 
the Commission’s proposed new enlargement 
methodology, which was announced in February 
2020 (European Commission 2020a), in part in 
response to French concerns. 
This was followed up by the Zagreb Summit 
at the beginning of May 2020. The fact that 
Furthermore, two surveys indicate that there is 
wavering commitment and, in fact, more general 
hostility to enlargement among EU citizens. First, 
Eurobarometer data show that enlargement has 
substantially less support among EU citizens 
than any other key policy area surveyed by 
Eurobarometer (Figure III.2). Second, according 
to the European Council on Foreign Relations 
(ECFR) (Tcherneva 2019), only 22 percent of 
French and 26 percent of Germans think even 
‘some’ Western Balkan countries should be 
allowed to join the EU in the next decade despite 
the Commission’s 2025 target date for the 
accession of Serbia and Montenegro (Figure III.3). 
The changing political backdrop in the EU 
itself is having an important influence on such 
sentiments. Granted, Brexit and the rise of 
Eurosceptic parties in other member states 
don’t have much, if anything, to do with the 
Western Balkans. However, they could have 
an indirect negative impact on their potential 
accessions, and they have prompted a great deal 
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First, tensions within the region along the 
traditional lines (Serbia-Kosovo and within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) are perhaps as high as 
they have been for some time, and they are only 
being heightened by the potentially dangerous 
considerations of border adjustments and 
territorial swaps along ethnical lines. Second, 
there is the Covid-19 pandemic and the impact 
it will have on the region in economic, social 
and political terms. In 2020, many Western 
Balkan countries will experience their worst 
recessions in the past two decades (Figure III.4). 
Weak healthcare capacity, a heavy reliance on 
capital flows (e.g. remittances and FDI) and, in 
some cases, a strong dependence on tourism 
will exacerbate the scale and duration of their 
economic downturns. This, in turn, has the 
potential to set back regional cooperation 
initiatives. 
Recent contributions to the debate around the 
efficacy of regional cooperation in the Western 
the Zagreb Summit was held at all during the 
lockdown triggered by the coronavirus pandemic 
indicates that the Western Balkans have some 
degree of importance for the EU. However, the 
declaration issued at the end of the summit only 
mentions the region’s ‘EU perspective’ rather 
than ‘enlargement’, which suggests a high degree 
of caution among at least some member states 
about the accession prospects of the Western 
Balkan states (EU 2020). In concrete terms, this 
statement said nothing about EU enlargement for 
the Western Balkans that had not already been 
said 17 years earlier in Thessaloniki. 
An issue more important than ever
In mid-2020, the question regarding the best way 
to ensure political and economic development as 
well as to bring the Western Balkans into the EU is 
more relevant than ever. Two recent developments 
reinforce the importance of this discussion. 
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Second, we evaluate EU regional economic 
cooperation initiatives in two stages: i) we 
outline exactly what the EU did; and ii) we assess 
the outcomes. Here, our hypothesis is that the 
condition set in the previous paragraph was 
not met, i.e. that the economic and financial 
incentives offered to the Western Balkans were 
not big enough to fully overcome the political, 
institutional and economic barriers to fostering 
regional cooperation. 
Third, we will sum up the state of play in 2020. In 
doing so, we will evaluate the extent to which the 
prerequisites for successful regional cooperation 
– in the political, institutional, economic and 
financial senses – exist in 2020 in a significantly 
different way than was formerly the case. 
Fourth, we will look at the concrete ways in which 
the Western Balkans could be integrated into 
the EU in economic terms, and ask whether this 
would represent a potentially more promising 
strategy for economic development and regional 
integration. 
Finally, on the basis of this evaluation, we will 
conclude this study with some suggestions for  
a way forward. 
Balkans have suggested various paths forward. 
Despite the apparently disappointing results of 
the last 20 years, some within the region have 
argued for a renewed push towards regional 
cooperation and integration, and the most 
prominent suggestions have called for a Regional 
Economic Area (REA) for the whole region or 
a ‘mini-Schengen’ comprising Albania, North 
Macedonia and Serbia. By contrast, others have 
suggested that now is the time for a more radical 
rethink and for focusing more intensely on 
greater integration with the EU (Bieber 2019). 
Aims of this paper
In this challenging context, this paper sets out to 
analyse and evaluate the EU strategy of regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans from an 
economic perspective. We want to take another 
look at what the EU is setting out to do as well 
as at the measures and instruments that have 
been put in place in addition to ascertaining the 
outcomes as concretely as possible. If the EU has 
indeed failed, it is crucial to understand why and 
to what extent the strategy has failed in order to 
be able to plot a more realistic and hopeful path 
forward for the region in terms of its economic 
development and EU accession. 
In order to answer these questions, we will take 
the following steps: 
First, we will look at the political and institutional 
context for regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans as it existed at the beginning of the 
2000s. Using the example of postwar Franco-
German cooperation as a guide, we will ask 
to what extent the political, institutional and 
economic prerequisites for regional cooperation 
existed at that time. Our assumption here is 
that the political and institutional barriers were 
large, which meant that the EU would need to 
offer something very attractive in economic and 
financial terms to overcome them. 
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In this chapter, we will address the theoretical 
prerequisites for regional cooperation, and 
examine whether they existed in the Western 
Balkans at the beginning of the 2000s. To do so, 
we will ask three main questions: First, did the 
necessary institutional underpinnings for regional 
cooperation exist? Second, were the political 
incentives for the key players sufficiently aligned 
to give regional cooperation a fighting chance of 
succeeding? Third, did the economic conditions 
exist to make regional cooperation even possible?
Previous successful regional cooperation 
initiatives, such as the postwar rapprochement 
of France and Germany, can provide a useful 
guide to which kinds of institutional, political 
and economic factors are important for regional 
cooperation to work. In this chapter, we will 
regularly refer back to this example. 
IV.1  Institutional underpinnings
At least some of the following institutional 
prerequisites would have needed to be in place 
for successful regional cooperation:
•  A strong outside force or forces pushing 
countries to cooperate and willing to 
intervene if necessary
• Some degree of local ownership
•  The absence of territorial issues or a realistic 
path towards solving them
•  A functioning political relationship between 
the countries and a reasonable level of trust 
among the partners 
•  Decent institutional and governance 
standards across all parties
Outside forces 
Since the end of the Second World War, the 
US has maintained a large and active presence 
in Western Europe in military, political and 
economic terms, and played an important role in 
underpinning Franco-German reconciliation and 
cooperation. In some ways, this is comparable 
with the role of the EU and the US in the Western 
Balkans beginning in the mid-1990s. Both were 
strong outside forces with a clear commitment to 
the region, and each of them sought to use their 
strengths to play a stabilising role and to push for 
regional cooperation. What’s more, starting in the 
late 1990s, the EU and the US also put in place 
a series of important institutional structures to 
foster and drive regional cooperation. 
The different roles of the two outside actors 
has been characterised as an EU ‘carrot’ and a 
US ‘stick’. The former provided incentives, with 
eventual EU accession being the major one, 
but also other economic and financial support. 
Meanwhile, the US ensured security and played 
the role of ‘bad cop’, when necessary. The US 
played a decisive role, for example, in bringing 
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to a close 
IV.  Theoretical prerequisites for regional 
cooperation and their existence in the 
Western Balkans
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and eventual success of the initiatives. In the 
Western Balkans, as well, regional cooperation 
has never been entirely driven from outside. For 
example, the South-East European Cooperation 
Process (SEECP),5 launched by Bulgaria in 1996, 
marked a continuation of the initial ministerial 
conferences of the Balkan countries during the 
late 1980s, which had ceased during the Yugoslav 
wars. These conferences resulted in the Sofia 
Declaration, with its commitment to maintaining 
borders and security cooperation. In addition to 
looking forward to regional cooperation in terms 
of infrastructure, telecoms and trade, the SEECP 
was also part of the region’s attempt to rebrand 
itself, so to speak, following the wars of the 1990s 
and to promote a more positive image to the rest 
of the world. 
However, it wasn’t long before the momentum 
of the SEECP initiative stalled. One contributory 
factor was the growing impression in some 
Balkan countries that their commitment to 
regional cooperation might ultimately come at 
the expense of their EU accession ambitions. 
Croatia and Slovenia participated as outsiders, 
while North Macedonia did not attend due to its 
dispute with Greece over its name. Bulgaria and 
Romania vetoed a Greek proposal to establish a 
permanent secretariat because they worried it 
would delay their EU accession process. 
Since 2008, there has been a much greater 
sense of local ownership of the process of 
regional cooperation. In that year, the Regional 
Cooperation Council (RCC) become operational. 
The RCC has 46 participants, including the 
aforementioned Western Balkan Six, other 
countries from the region (including Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey), 
the EU, the US, the UN and various other 
international organisations and countries. Its 
5 Launched by Bulgaria, the SEECP also included Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, North Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey. Croatia, Moldova, 
Montenegro (as an independent state), Slovenia and Kosovo 
joined later.
with the Dayton Agreement in late 1995 and by 
bombing Serbia in 1999 to get it to end the war in 
Kosovo. This division of labour continues in more 
or less the same form to this day. 
From the outside, the EU and the US have sought 
to push for greater cohesiveness across many 
fields (political, economic, social, cultural, etc) 
within the region. The thinking behind this has 
been that countries will be forced to cooperate 
and become more economically integrated 
with and dependent on each other, and that the 
geography of animosity would be reduced over 
time and therefore make EU accession possible. 
According to this logic, the appeal of EU accession 
would be so powerful for elites in the Western 
Balkans that it would change the internal political 
dynamics of the countries in the region, and 
eventual EU accession would make these changes 
in dynamics permanent. 
Although the EU’s military role cannot be 
compared to that of the US, it has had an 
important political role to play, particularly 
in maintaining post-conflict stability and in 
providing mediation on issues that did not involve 
any significant territorial dispute. Mediation in 
Albania after the 1997 civil war, the secession 
of Montenegro from Serbia in 2006, and the 
resolution of the name dispute between North 
Macedonia and Greece can probably be viewed 
as the main political successes of the EU in the 
Western Balkans over this period. In the case 
of Kosovo, the EU was partly successful both in 
maintaining stability within the country and in 
securing the decision of the International Court 
of Justice on Kosovan independence.
Local ownership 
Although the US role in postwar Europe has 
been key in terms of fostering Franco-German 
cooperation, local ownership of the process and 
the ‘buy-in’ of elites in the two countries has 
been crucial to the effective implementation 
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which was put forward at the Trieste Summit 
of 2017 and endorsed by the leaders of the 
Western Balkan Six. The MAP was coordinated 
by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 
response to a request by the six leaders and in 
cooperation with the European Commission 
(Regional Cooperation Council 2017). The idea 
was to remove barriers to enable the free flow of 
goods, services, capital and ‘highly skilled’ labour, 
to achieve digital integration, and to introduce 
standardised rules for businesses. 
The EU’s support for this effort was reaffirmed 
with the adoption of a Digital Agenda for the 
Western Balkans in June 2018, and for the REA 
in general at the Western Balkans Summit held 
in London in July 2018 (European Commission 
2018). In a press release following the summit, 
the European Commission specifically mentioned 
upgrading digital skills, ways to mobilise non-
banking financing for SMEs and startups, the 
energy transition (including better mobilisation 
of hydrocarbon resources), and a new guarantee 
instrument worth up to EUR 150 million for the 
2019–2020 period. This guarantee instrument 
aims to leverage investments of up to EUR 1 
billion in a range of sectors in an attempt to 
improve access to finance in the region. 
This was followed in the second half of 2019 
by the plan for a ‘mini-Schengen’ comprising 
Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia. Unlike with 
the MAP for the REA, Kosovo refused to take 
part in the ‘mini-Schengen’, while Montenegro 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet made 
a decision regarding whether to participate. 
However, even before the outbreak of the 
coronavirus pandemic, there was a sense that this 
initiative had lost its momentum (Maksimović 
2020). 
role has been to coordinate the various regional 
cooperation initiatives that have been launched. 
In addition to the RCC and SEECP, many other 
‘locally owned’ regional cooperation initiatives 
are present in the region. Indeed, the period 
since 2008 has seen a “flourishing of regional 
initiatives, networks, task forces, and projects” 
(Minic 2018). Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski (2015) 
propose an additional useful framework in this 
context, categorising the regional cooperation 
initiatives according to whether they are 
externally or locally owned, but also according to 
whether they are top-down or bottom-up. Even 
when supported by the EU, these organisations 
are locally managed and directed (Minic 2018). 
The locally owned, bottom-up initiatives are 
a particularly positive development, as they 
indicate that there is an actively engaged group of 
citizens in the Western Balkans who are keen to 
take ownership of regional cooperation not only 
from outsiders, but also from their own ‘elites’. 
At the elite level, there have also been some 
important steps. Prompted above all by 
Montenegro, the Western Balkan countries 
teamed up to form the Western Balkans Six 
in 2013. The initiative was formally launched 
at the London-based European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 
February 2014. Croatia, which had just joined the 
EU, also participated. The Western Balkans Six 
format exists within the wider SEECP. However, 
the meetings of all six prime ministers in this 
smaller format was seen as important given their 
stronger set of overlapping interests. What’s 
more, in May 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the SEECP was formed (although the SEECP 
had had a parliamentary dimension since 1997) 
in order to foster more cooperation among the 
individual state parliaments (Bechev, Ejdus and 
Taleski 2015). 
Initially, it was announced that there would be 
a Multi-annual Action Plan (MAP) on a Regional 
Economic Area (REA) in the Western Balkans, 
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Institutional and governance 
standards
A decent level of state capacity is a prerequisite 
for interstate cooperation and, by extension, 
regional cooperation. Moreover, even when 
the political will exists, a reasonable level of 
institutional and governance standards is 
required to ensure that the decisions taken are 
also actually implemented. This is especially 
important when the decisions are politically 
difficult, such as when making compromises 
with a recent enemy. By contrast, persistent 
animosity between states, like the one that has 
been present in parts of the Western Balkans 
over the last two decades, can be viewed as 
lending support to autocratic and non-democratic 
regimes. 
The particular weakness of governance and 
institutions has been identified as a barrier to 
economic recovery and political normalisation 
immediately after the wars of the 1990s 
(Gligorov, Kaldor and Tsoukalis 1999). Below, 
we use the World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators to assess governance standards in 
the Western Balkans over the past 20 years. It 
can hardly be argued that governance standards 
were of a high standard in any of the Western 
Balkan countries, nor can that be said to be the 
case today (see Figure IV.1). This is likely to have 
impeded regional cooperation efforts. 
Territorial issues 
The wars in the former Yugoslavia ended with 
a host of territorial disputes and constitutional 
issues within the successor states. Among the 
Western Balkan countries, only North Macedonia 
did not have any unresolved border disputes 
with the other former Yugoslav countries, but it 
did have serious disputes with both Greece and 
Bulgaria regarding its name. These unresolved 
territorial and constitutional issues lie at the 
heart of the geography of animosity, and they 
represent quite an important difference from 
the situation in postwar Western Europe. In this 
sense, the Western Balkans in the early 2000s is 
more comparable to France and Germany after 
the First World War. Unlike in Western Europe 
after the Second World War, there wasn’t any 
final defeat and/or unconditional surrender of 
one of the parties in the Western Balkans. 
Political relationships and trust
One of the really challenging issues in terms of 
solving the geography of animosity via regional 
cooperation has been getting local elites to buy 
into this process. In Western Europe after the 
Second World War, elites in both France and 
Germany played an important role in ensuring 
the success of cooperation between the two 
countries. Unfortunately, this has so far not been 
the case – or at least not to the same extent – in 
the Western Balkans. Gligorov (2008) has written 
that Balkan states have a “weak political will 
and weak inclination for regional cooperation”. 
Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski (2015) reached a similar 
conclusion, stating that regional cooperation has 
a low level of priority for politicians in the region. 
No matter what the EU has done, it is clear that 
this reality has had the potential to seriously 
undermine regional cooperation initiatives in  
the region. 
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Otherwise, it is very difficult to say what 
defines these countries as a group. Albania 
was not part of Yugoslavia, and neither Albania 
nor North Macedonia has significant border 
conflicts within the region. Furthermore, the 
geography of animosity essentially connects 
three countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo and Serbia, with Albania being indirectly 
involved via its relationship with Kosovo. While 
both Serbia and Montenegro have started EU 
accession negotiations, an agreement to begin 
talks with Albania and North Macedonia has 
also been taken. But Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will probably have to wait at least 
a few more years. Together, this makes having a 
single regional cooperation template – whether 
imposed from outside or generated internally – 
quite awkward. 
In this context, the relationship of the Western 
Balkan countries with the EU has been defined 
as a “broken cobweb” (Gligorov 2004). The EU 
is the centre of the cobweb, with the Western 
Balkan countries arranged around it in a ‘hub-
and-spoke’ model. However, the spokes are 
not all equal, and neither are the connections 
between the countries around the hub. While 
some Western Balkan countries have cooperated 
and enjoyed stronger ties with each other, others 
have effectively not had any relationships at all in 
economic and political terms. 
Benefits for all
It is by no means clear that all countries involved 
have felt like they would enjoy any significant 
benefits from regional cooperation. There are 
four key reasons for this:
First, countries that were more advanced 
economically (e.g. Croatia) would almost 
certainly feel held back by the less developed 
countries and/or those engaged in bilateral 
regional conflicts. As Figure IV.2 shows, the 
Western Balkan countries were and continue 
IV.2  Alignment of political 
incentives
At least some of the following political incentives 
to cooperate would have had to exist in the 
Western Balkans in the early 2000s for regional 
cooperation to have succeeded:
•  The countries pursuing regional cooperation 
should be a unified group.
•  All players (but especially the big ones) need 
to feel they are getting something important 
out of this cooperation and, crucially, 
something that they can ‘sell’ to their 
populations to justify having to cooperate 
with (in many cases) a recent enemy.
•  An outside threat (as the USSR was perceived 
to be in Germany, France and other countries 
by the late 1940s).
Unified group
The idea of European integration has a long 
history in Western Europe and, as a result, those 
pushing for the rapprochement of France and 
Germany after the Second World War had an 
extensive intellectual and emotional legacy to 
fall back on. On the other hand, there is no real 
equivalent to the ‘European idea’ for the Western 
Balkans in a way that would include the whole 
region in efforts to foster regional cooperation. 
During the last two decades, there have really 
only been two things that defined the Western 
Balkan countries as a distinct group. First, 
they had a theoretically realistic EU ‘accession 
perspective’, as defined in Thessaloniki in 2003. 
This distinguished them from other countries, 
such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Second, 
they had not (and still have not) yet joined the EU, 
which distinguishes them from Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Romania. 
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role within a system of regional cooperation, its 
incentives to cooperate would naturally be lower 
than those of the other five countries.
Third, those countries that did not have serious 
bilateral disputes with others in the Western 
Balkans and were not directly involved in the 
geography of animosity would also naturally 
see the rationale for and benefits of regional 
cooperation differently. This particularly applies 
to North Macedonia and Montenegro.
Fourth, for both elites and the general population, 
it would be quite natural to prioritise EU 
accession over regional cooperation. The 
potential for EU funds (for governments), 
investments by major Western companies (for 
firms), and the opportunity to travel, work and 
live in Western Europe (for ordinary citizens) 
would naturally be very attractive. There has 
therefore always been an inherent tension 
between regional cooperation and the bilateral 
to be at quite different stages of development. 
This was especially the case as long as Croatia 
was involved in regional cooperation. In 2000, 
Croatia’s GDP per capita was 40 percent of the 
German level, compared with around 17 percent 
for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. After 
Croatia ‘graduated’ out of regional cooperation 
by becoming a member of the EU in 2013, the 
differences in economic development levels have 
become less stark. However, they have grown 
somewhat over time. In 2018, Montenegro’s GDP 
per capita was around 40 percent of the German 
level, compared with 33 percent for Serbia and 22 
percent for Kosovo.
Second, Serbia’s total nominal GDP has generally 
been roughly the same as the combined total of 
the other five countries in the Western Balkan Six 
throughout the last two decades, and it has had 
better opportunities for integrating outside the 
region than its peers have. Therefore, as long as 
Serbia isn’t given some kind of leading/dominant 
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IV.3 Economic fundamentals 
Building on the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) example, and taking into 
account the Western Balkan context of the early 
2000s, we define the prerequisites for effective 
regional cooperation in the Western Balkans in 
an economic sense as follows: 
•  The proposed economic area should be 
of a sufficient size and level of economic 
development to make the participants feel 
that the potential upside is significant and 
worth whatever political capital has to be 
spent to make it work. It should also be 
attractive enough to remove the incentive to 
prioritise economic integration outside the 
region.6
•  Trade and investment among the parties 
should be below historical levels, meaning 
that there should be a high level of potential 
for increased intraregional trade and 
investment.
•  The participants should have roughly similar 
shares of intraregional trade and investment 
compared to these shares outside the region. 
•  There should be some degree of 
complementarity in terms of production 
structures. 
•  The participants should have similar 
priorities in terms of economic development 
and their willingness/ability to coordinate 
policy.
•  There should be proper transport, energy and 
other infrastructure connectivity or at least 
the means and desire to create this.
6 The parallel here is with the UK in the late 1940s. There were 
various reasons why the UK didn’t join European integration 
at the start. But, in economic terms, it was because its main 
economic ties were not with the rest of Europe, unlike the 
case with France and Germany (and the smaller countries, 
such as Belgium and Luxembourg).
process of EU accession. In fact, this is a 
procedural shortcoming of the EU integration 
process in the Western Balkans: While requiring 
regional cooperation, it not only relies on, but 
also fosters competition among the candidate 
countries through bilateral negotiations and 
evaluation of their progress. 
Outside threats
The Western Balkan countries have experienced 
many (real and perceived) outside threats over 
the last two decades. However, these have not 
been the same for each country. 
Different countries have had different views 
of the EU as a security provider working in 
parallel with NATO. However, this can mainly be 
attributed to dynamics within the region rather 
than to what any outside actors have actually 
done. For Montenegro and North Macedonia, 
and previously for Slovenia and Croatia, the 
EU has been a source of security in an internal 
constitutional sense as well as a protector from 
external foes. 
On the other hand, Russia has often been 
perceived as a threat, even though Serbia and 
Republika Srpska, the Serb entity within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, have viewed it as a friend. 
North Macedonia has seen Greece and Bulgaria 
as a threat. Croatia has had serious territorial 
issues with Slovenia. But at no point has there 
been a single, feared, outside enemy that all of 
the countries shared in common and that could 
mitigate the importance of local antagonisms 
in the way that the USSR was for France and 
Germany beginning in the late 1940s.
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Western Balkans apart from Croatia had a GDP 
per capita of more than 22 percent of the German 
level in PPP terms (i.e. adjusted for local costs). 
In this context, the expected gains from regional 
economic integration were understandably 
not very high. With the exception of tourism in 
Croatia and Montenegro, few industries in any of 
the countries were at an advanced stage, which 
further limited the potential for cross-border 
trade and integration. In just a very few cases, 
the potential upsides from increased regional 
economic integration were attractive enough to 
avoid prioritising integration outside the region 
for those that were in a position to do so. 
This point particularly applies to Serbia, which 
has integrated quite extensively into the German 
and Italian manufacturing clusters over the past 
two decades at the expense of regional economic 
integration. Serbia has also signed a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic 
Union7 and, more recently, it has started to 
attract larger amounts of Chinese investment 
and other forms of foreign capital. In addition 
to making regional economic integration more 
difficult, greater economic integration with China 
and Russia are also likely to make eventual EU 
integration much trickier. This is not because 
investment from China or Russia is problematic 
per se, but because the type of money coming 
from these sources (e.g. investment in natural 
resources and loans for infrastructure) can go 
against various EU rules and thereby complicate 
the adoption of the acquis. 
Shares of trade and investment 
within/outside the region
The split between intra- and extraregional trade 
and investment among the Western Balkan 
countries varies widely. Although the data for 
7 Signed in late 2019, this FTA replaced existing FTAs with 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In order to join the EU, 
Serbia would have to give this up. 
•  There should be concomitant strong growth 
in the regional and global economies, as 
taking difficult political steps is easier when 
wider economic conditions are supportive.
Trade and investment relative to 
historical levels
The conflicts of the 1990s caused a breakdown 
of trading relationships, which meant that there 
was much potential for increased intraregional 
trade in the short term. However, beyond this 
immediate effect, the upside for regional trade 
and investment integration at the start of the 
2000s was limited. Even if all the old links could 
have been quickly re-established – which, 
admittedly, is hardly realistic after an armed 
conflict – this would not have generated much 
extra economic growth or rising prosperity 
compared with increased trade and investment 
with those outside the Balkans and especially 
with Western Europe. Various studies (e.g. 
Christie 2001; Damijan, de Sousa and Lamotte 
2009) have shown that intraregional trade was 
already at or even above potential in the early 
years of the 2000s, whereas trade with the rest  
of the world was often far below potential.
Size and level of economic 
development
The regional cooperation economic area of 
the Western Balkans was not very big or 
economically developed, and especially not in 
comparison with Western Europe. Including 
Croatia, the Western Balkan Seven had a 
nominal GDP equivalent to 3.3 percent of that of 
Germany in 2000, and only 0.7 percent of what 
would become the EU28. Excluding Croatia, the 
respective figures for the Western Balkan Six 
were 2.2 percent and 0.5 percent in 2000. In 
per capita terms, the region’s level of economic 
development was also very low relative to 
Western Europe. In 2002, no country in the 
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Data on intraregional foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the Western Balkans in the early 2000s 
are quite limited. As of 2005, data are available 
for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North 
Macedonia and Serbia. These data show that 
only a tiny share of the total inward FDI stock 
originated from the rest of the Western Balkans 
(Figure IV.4). For all Western Balkan countries, 
the only realistic source of large-scale FDI at 
this point was from outside the region and 
particularly from the EU. 
Complementarity in production 
structures
A lack of diversity in production structures 
could be a serious problem when attempting to 
create a regional economic area including several 
countries. If the countries are underdeveloped 
and produce by and large the same low-end final 
products or raw materials, there will be little 
trade or other cooperation between them. 
2000 are very piecemeal and likely to have been 
strongly affected by the recent conflicts, we 
have a fuller picture beginning with the data for 
2005. At this point, the two smallest and most 
closed economies in the region – namely, those of 
Montenegro and Kosovo – both conducted a large 
share of their trade within the region. In that year, 
Kosovo sent 51 percent of its exports to other 
Western Balkan countries, and Montenegro 41 
percent. However, the analogous figures for the 
other countries were much lower: 7 percent for 
Albania, 17 percent for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
23 percent for Serbia, and 26 percent for North 
Macedonia. 
Even for Kosovo and Montenegro, the most likely 
explanation for the high share of intraregional 
trade is that they didn’t really trade much 
with anyone and had few industries capable 
of exporting outside the region. For example, 
Kosovo’s total exports in 2005 were worth EUR 
56.3 million and Montenegro’s EUR 369.3 million, 
compared with EUR 3.6 billion for Serbia (Figure 
IV.3).
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Balkans, and “customs and trade regulations are a 
major problem for many exporters”. Kaloyanchev, 
Kusen and Mouzakitis (2018) found a significant 
and negative impact of non-tariff trade barriers. 
Moreover, Damijan, de Sousa and Lamotte (2009) 
showed that firms exporting within the region – 
at least to the less competitive parts – could see a 
negative impact on their productivity growth. 
The World Bank’s “Doing Business” ranking sub-
component for trading across borders provides 
some further insight into barriers to trade for 
the Western Balkan countries (Figure IV.5).8 
Taken together, the data suggest the following 
conclusions:
•  First, barriers to trade for Western Balkan 
countries, in terms of both time and cost, are 
considerably higher than for Slovenia and 
Croatia (and EU members in general). 
8 These data do not allow for differentiation between intra- 
and extra-Western Balkan trade.
There is some evidence for a complementarity 
of production structures in the Western Balkans 
in the early 2000s. It is certainly not correct 
to say that they all produced the same things; 
as mentioned, the countries had different 
comparative advantages. However, there was no 
obvious anchor in terms of economic structure 
for regional cooperation that could be compared 
to coal and steel for France and Germany in the 
postwar period. At that time, France wanted 
cooperation because its steel industry needed 
coal and a market to export to, and Germany was 
willing to engage in cooperation to remove the 
political obstacles to production (Petzina, Stolper 
and Hudson 1981).
However, even if production structures are 
theoretically complementary, integration can 
be impeded by tariff and non-tariff barriers. As 
Levitin and Sanfey (2018) point out, although 
there has been some progress recently, 
“significant trade barriers exist” in the Western 
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FIGURE IV.4  FDI inward stock by source, percentage of total, 2005 
Source: wiiw.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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greater efforts its policymakers make to 
ease restrictions on trade. The relatively 
more closed nature of the economies of 
Kosovo and Montenegro (at least in terms 
of goods) may explain the tougher trading 
conditions there, as it is less of a priority for 
policymakers. 
Economic development priorities 
and policy coordination
At the start of the 2000s, the Western Balkan 
countries had marked differences not only in 
terms of their respective levels of development, 
but also in terms of economic specialisation and, 
in some cases, development priorities. Indeed, 
conditions like those that existed between France 
and Germany after the Second World War, 
such as their overlapping interests in terms of 
economic development priorities, cannot really 
be said to have existed in the Western Balkans in 
the last 20 years. 
•  Second, using Croatia as a benchmark, 
on average for the other Western Balkan 
countries, the biggest problem, both in terms 
of time and cost, is border compliance for 
imports. 
•  Third, the restrictions on trade for Western 
Balkan countries are often at least as high, if 
not higher, than those for some comparable 
non-EU members, such as Moldova, Turkey 
and Ukraine, although in most cases, the 
Western Balkan countries have lower 
restrictions on cross-border trade than the 
averages for Europe and Central Asia. 
•  Fourth, there is significant differentiation 
within the region. Trading conditions are 
generally better for Serbia and worse for 
Kosovo (and to a certain extent Montenegro). 
This may reflect Serbia’s increased 
specialisation in the production of autos 
and automotive parts, its integration into 
global value chains and, consequently, the 
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impact of lowering tariffs; second, to decrease 
distortions and rent-seeking by firms (as a 
simplified and more transparent tax system 
in the Western Balkans could help to reduce 
resource misallocation); and, third, to potentially 
reduce the size of the informal economy. 
Indeed, the informal economy is often helped 
by opportunities to exploit differences in fiscal 
policies. In any case, fiscal policies are difficult 
to coordinate. This can even be seen in the EU, 
where tensions regularly emerge over fiscal 
policy both between member states and between 
individual member states and the European 
Commission. 
Connectivity 
Even compared with most of the rest of Eastern 
Europe, connectivity in the Western Balkans 
has been weak for at least a couple of centuries 
(Holzner 2015). As it does almost everywhere 
else, infrastructure development mirrors political 
developments in the Western Balkans. However, 
this has often been most problematic within 
rather than between countries in the region. 
In infrastructure terms, as in much else, most 
Western Balkan countries are oriented outward 
rather than inward.
Croatia, for example, has historically suffered 
from bad internal connections, which is a legacy 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus, Istria 
is connected to Italy, but has not been well 
connected with Zagreb. The Dalmatian hinterland 
has also been difficult to reach from other parts 
of the country. In some cases, the connections 
between the different states of Yugoslavia were 
better. The key transport route in the region 
roughly followed that of the old Orient Express, 
starting in Thessalonica and then winding its way 
through Skopje, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana 
before heading up to Munich. However, there have 
been disruptions since 1991, such as the train 
connections from Split to Belgrade, and many of 
these connections have not been re-established. 
However, most countries have increasingly 
specialised in their areas of comparative 
advantage, which is not a barrier to regional 
cooperation. Instead, these different production 
structures can be seen as complimentary. Albania, 
Croatia and Montenegro all have comparative 
advantages in tourism, while landlocked 
Serbia and North Macedonia have followed 
a development path based on manufacturing 
exports. Both have integrated into the German 
manufacturing core, albeit at a relatively 
low-value section of the production chain in 
the case of North Macedonia, in particular 
(Gligorov 2017). The exception is Kosovo, which 
has an extremely closed economy with little 
international integration except in terms of 
remittance inflows from citizens working abroad.
The real issue here is not that the economies have 
been similarly specialised or have had necessarily 
different developmental priorities. Instead, it 
relates to policy coordination within the context 
of regional cooperation. As economies become 
more integrated with each other, it produces 
‘agglomeration effects’ – meaning that wealthy 
areas attract capital and skills, and poorer areas 
lose out. There is some evidence that this effect 
persists over time, causing ever-wider regional 
disparities and requiring a high degree of policy 
coordination and intervention to address it. 
For example, this is a huge problem in the EU 
(Graebner et al. 2018). For regional cooperation 
to have truly worked, policy coordination would 
have been required. However, for political but 
also other reasons, policy coordination has been 
very limited in the Western Balkans during the 
period studied here. 
Exchange rate misalignments and the risks 
of devaluation due to shocks are part of the 
reason for the historically weak regional trade 
integration. Meanwhile, fiscal policy coordination 
is still far off. There are several reasons to 
better coordinate fiscal policies in the region: 
first, to support trade liberalisation, as strong 
tax competition can significantly reduce the 
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Growth in the regional/global 
economy
All else being equal, strong growth in the 
European and global economies would have been 
supportive of regional cooperation efforts in 
the Western Balkans. This would have filtered 
through to the Western Balkans in various ways, 
including export demand, tourism and various 
types of capital inflows (e.g. remittances, FDI, 
etc). This, in turn, could have made it easier to 
demonstrate the benefits of regional cooperation 
and to force through politically difficult decisions 
to integrate the region’s economies. 
This supportive backdrop existed at the outset 
of the period covered in this paper. In the 2000–
2007 period, global real GDP growth was 
around 4.5 percent, compared with an average 
of 3.5 percent for the 1980–2019 period. In 
the last four decades, the best three years for 
the global economy have been 2004, 2006 and 
Financing options to try to overcome these poor 
connections were limited at the start of the 
2000s, not least because the Western Balkan 
countries only had limited access to EU funds 
relative to the CEE member states, where net 
inflows in some recent years have been more 
than 5 percent of gross national income (GNI; 
Figure IV.6).9 In fact, in the formerly communist 
countries that joined the EU beginning in 2004, 
EU funds have financed the majority of public 
infrastructure spending.10 
9 The European Commission publishes this data as a share 
of GNI rather than of GDP. GNI is GDP plus income earned 
abroad in any year by a nation’s citizens and firms. For most 
countries, the difference is quite small. The main exception 
is when a particularly large share of a country’s production is 
owned by foreigners, with the famous example of this being 
Ireland.
10 A more extensive look at infrastructure investment in the 
Western Balkans is provided in Chapter V.
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FIGURE IV.6  Net inflows from the EU budget, as a percentage of Gross National Income
Source: European Commission.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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Emerson 2005). It was assumed that there was 
much greater growth potential for exports to 
and investment from the EU than within the 
region owing to the weakness of demand in 
the Western Balkans and the small size of the 
markets. Proponents of this idea also argued 
that trade liberalisation within the Western 
Balkans would be at least partly offset by policy 
divergences, different customs regimes and 
other non-tariff barriers to trade. They probably 
also felt that such an arrangement would drive a 
more concrete ‘Europeanisation’ of the region by 
transposing EU legislation onto domestic policy 
agendas. Finally, the importance of borders in the 
region could only be reduced, according to this 
thinking, once the Western Balkans were part of 
a bigger unit (i.e. the EU).
In the end, the EU chose a combination of the 
two approaches, although the first one – regional 
integration – was pushed more strongly. In this 
chapter, we will look at how the EU strategy was 
implemented and what the results were. Our 
focus is on trade, investment and infrastructure 
for two reasons: First, these were the key 
instruments used by the EU to drive regional 
economic integration. And, second, measuring 
progress in these areas will provide us with an 
answer to the question of just how successful 
efforts at regional economic cooperation and 
integration have been.11
11 The trade and investment sections of this chapter summarise 
the results of a longer technical paper (Grieveson, Holzner 
and Vuksic 2020), which will be published in parallel with this 
study. 
As Chapter IV has outlined, the institutional, 
political and economic obstacles to regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans (as the EU 
intended it) have been substantial. Therefore, in 
economic and financial terms, the EU would have 
to offer a whole lot – in terms of incentives and 
support – to achieve a level of regional economic 
cooperation and integration that could surmount 
these political and institutional hurdles. 
In the early 2000s, policymakers, the think-
tank community and other stakeholders had an 
intense debate about how to achieve regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans in an 
economic sense. Two main approaches were 
discussed.
First, some pushed the idea of focusing on 
stronger economic integration within the region, 
specifically with a regional free trade agreement 
(FTA) (see e.g. Maur and Messerlin 2001). The 
argument for a regional FTA was based on the 
assumption that there was a lot of potential to 
increase intraregional trade, in part because 
so much trade at that time went along ‘ethnic’ 
lines. This was perhaps not an unreasonable 
assumption in the context of the early 2000s, 
as the wars of the 1990s had badly disrupted 
regional trade flows, and some country pairs 
effectively did not trade with each other at all. 
The second argument was to focus more on 
integration with the much bigger EU market 
instead of prioritising specifically intraregional 
Western Balkan integration (Gligorov 1998; 
V.  The EU strategy for economic integration: 
Implementation and results
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analysis focusing on the BITs in the Western 
Balkan countries.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
The investment aspect of Western Balkan 
economic integration has proceeded unevenly. 
A couple of agreements (i.e. North Macedonia’s 
BITs with Albania and Serbia) entered into force 
at the end of the 1990s, but momentum did not 
really pick up until the early 2000s (Table V.1).12 
Currently, Albania has a BIT with every other 
Western Balkan Six country, but Kosovo only one 
with Albania. In total, there are 10 BITs in force 
among the Western Balkan countries.
We applied a structural gravity empirical 
modelling framework to test whether there is a 
relationship between BITs and FDI among the 
Western Balkan Six countries. Such treaties aim 
to encourage, promote and protect investments 
between two countries (UNCTAD 2000, 2007). 
While widely recognised empirical studies have 
found a strong positive relationship between BITs 
12 In contrast, many transition countries in CEE already had BITs 
in place (with other countries from the same group) by 1995, 
many entered into force by 2000, and only a smaller fraction 
did so in the early 2000s.
V.1 Trade and investment 
In this section, we will address the trade and 
investment aspects of the EU strategy. There 
have been a number of regional cooperation 
initiatives that have contributed to bilateral 
investment and trade flows between Western 
Balkan countries. Under these various umbrella 
arrangements, various bi- and multilateral trade 
and investment treaties have been initiated in the 
Western Balkans over the past two decades.
In this section, we will outline briefly what each 
of these initiatives has entailed before addressing 
their specific impacts. These initiatives included:
• Bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
• Free trade agreements (FTAs)
•  The Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA)
•  EU Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAAs)
All were either implicitly or explicitly part of 
the EU’s regional cooperation strategy. What’s 
more, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical 
TABLE V.1  Bilateral investment treaties in force among Western Balkan Six countries
Albania Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kosovo Montenegro* North 
Macedonia
Serbia
Albania 2009 2005 2004 1998 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009 2004 2004
Kosovo 2005
Montenegro* 2004 2011 2010
North Macedonia 1998 2004 2011 1997
Serbia 2004 2004 2010 1997
Source: CEFTA (http://cefta.int/reports-and-related-documents/).  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
*According to the Decision on Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Montenegro, adopted on 3 June 2006 by the 
Parliament of the Republic of Montenegro, which defines taking over and implementation of international treaties that have been 
concluded or joined by the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro and related to Montenegro, which are fully compliant with 
Montenegro’s legislations, Montenegro implements these Agreements and Conventions.
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Using six World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, we performed a regression analysis of 
the interplay of the institutional quality and BITs 
in affecting FDI stock.14 In each case, the scores 
for the Western Balkan countries were quite 
similar to each other, whereas the scores for the 
FDI source countries were on average higher. 
We found that BITs have a greater impact 
when the FDI-receiving country has better 
institutions relative to the source country. 
Given that the Western Balkan countries have 
a low level of institutional quality and that the 
differences between them are not very big, BITs 
have been less effective. The implication here 
is that countries in the Western Balkans could 
increase the effectiveness of their BITs and 
possibly attract more FDI if they could manage 
to implement reforms that enhance the quality 
of their institutions. This holds true for FDI from 
countries both within and outside the Western 
Balkans. 
One should, however, stress that the difference 
in institutional quality between sources and 
recipients of FDI is not the only factor that may 
lead to higher effectiveness of BITs and to more 
FDI in general. As shown by related research, this 
relationship may depend on the strength of BITs 
(Frenkel and Walter 2018) or on the prevailing 
type or sector of foreign investment (Colen, 
Persyn and Guariso 2016). Finally, the research 
by Estrin and Uvalic (2014) on the determinants 
of FDI shows that, after accounting for a broad 
set of other factors (including institutions), the 
Western Balkan countries receive less FDI, which 
the authors interpret as being a long-lasting 
consequence of the history of conflicts and 
political tensions.
14 For this, we used six different indicators available for all 
countries in our sample over most of the period covered 
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
database: Rule of Law; Control of Corruption; Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; Regulatory 
Quality; Government Effectiveness; Voice and Accountability.
and FDI (e.g. Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004), the 
evidence is mixed on the whole.13
Our results indicate that BITs do not correlate 
with FDI stock in a statistically significant way for 
either a broader sample of transition economies 
or for the Western Balkan countries. We also 
came up with similar conclusions after testing the 
relationship between FTAs and inward FDI stock. 
Although changing trade costs (caused by FTAs) 
may have affected some investors’ decisions to 
invest or not, the direction of the effect is not 
pronounced at the aggregate level.
How institutional factors have 
influenced the effectiveness of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
The difference in institutional quality between 
sending and receiving countries can affect FDI 
flows (see e.g. Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer 
2007) by influencing how successful BITs turn 
out to be (Desbordes and Vicard 2009). This is 
because foreign investors tend to commit for 
the long term, which makes them worry about 
whether their rights will be protected over many 
years (i.e. beyond the current political cycle). If 
the FDI-receiving country has better institutions, 
there is a higher likelihood that it will protect 
these rights over the long term. 
This is important in the context of regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans. The 
upgrading of institutional quality and 
independence is a key part of the EU accession 
process. This, in turn, can boost the effectiveness 
of BITs between Western Balkan countries and 
thereby foster regional cooperation. 
13 This is why the more recent studies try to look into details 
of this relationship, e.g. by considering the varying effects of 
BITs across sectors of FDI (Colen, Persyn and Guariso 2016) 
or the differences in the strength of BITs as investment-
protection mechanisms since BITs are not uniform (e.g. 
Frenkel and Walter 2018; Dixon and Haslam 2016). While our 
data does not allow for such detailed analysis, we do check 
for other factors that may influence the relationship between 
BITs and FDI, such as institutional development.
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the regression, we established a much stronger 
impact of FTAs on regional trade, of almost 70 
percent. 
Serbia is by far the region’s biggest economy, 
and its exports as a share of GDP increased 
sharply – more than fivefold – between 1999 
and 2018. This came at the same time as Serbian 
exports to Western Balkan countries as a share 
of its total exports declined strongly, while its 
share of exports to the EU increased from 51 
to 67 percent. This indicates quite a significant 
redirection of Serbian exports away from the 
region and towards the EU (which, as discussed 
later, was probably at least partially facilitated by 
the SAA). Therefore, we can say that FTAs have 
had a strong and positive impact on intraregional 
trade ties for the five smaller Western Balkan 
countries. However, for Serbia, the one country 
that could really expand its exports outside the 
region, this impact has been negligible relative to 
increased trade with the EU. 
Free trade agreements (FTAs)
Owing to the wars of the 1990s, the first bilateral 
FTAs arrived in the region relatively late (Table 
V.2). In 2002, North Macedonia signed separate 
FTAs with Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
while the latter also concluded a deal in the same 
year with Serbia and Montenegro (which was a 
single country at the time). Additional deals were 
signed in the 2003–2006 period. 
We analysed econometrically the impact of FTAs 
on economic integration between the Western 
Balkan countries. Across the whole sample 
used in our analysis (including many other non-
Western Balkan countries), we found that FTAs 
generally facilitate trade. All else being equal, an 
FTA between two countries increases exports 
by 27.1 percent. However, the impact of FTAs 
between Western Balkan countries specifically 
produced a smaller, albeit still clearly positive, 
effect. All else being equal, Western Balkan FTAs 
increased regional exports by 13.9 percent.
Still, given the small sample size and brief pre-
CEFTA period, our results for the Western 
Balkans could be affected by other factors. We 
applied various statistical techniques, including 
adding the CEFTA period. We found that Serbian 
exports had a big (and negative) influence on 
our results. When Serbia was excluded from 
TABLE V.2  FTAs concluded among Western Balkan Six countries before CEFTA
Destination Albania Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kosovo Montenegro North 
Macedonia
Serbia
Albania 2004 2003 2004 2002 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 2002 2002 2002
Kosovo 2003 2006
Montenegro* 2004 2002 2006
North Macedonia 2002 2002 2006 2006 2006
Serbia 2004 2002 2006
Source: DESTA (https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/downloads/).  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw. 
*The database does not contain information on these FTAs for Montenegro, as it was part of Serbia until 2006.
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EU – at least partly because of the SAA – is part 
of this. 
However, the second implication of the results is 
that CEFTA had a significant and positive impact 
on intraregional trade for the other countries. 
Excluding Serbia, the Western Balkan countries 
did not have very high potential to integrate 
into European value chains and export more to 
the EU. Therefore, as stated by Petreski (2018), 
in addition to being important for boosting 
members’ competitiveness and increasing their 
cooperation capacities in general, CEFTA played 
an important role in rebuilding the regional 
market and helping to increase trade in a way that 
would otherwise not have been possible for most 
Western Balkan countries.
One issue with CEFTA – which applies perhaps 
especially in the Serbian case – is that the 
agreement was accepted in the region not for 
the benefits that would come with it, but as an 
instrument to satisfy the EU’s requirements for 
regional cooperation. In return, the Western 
Balkan countries expected not only improved 
prospects of EU accession, but also greater and 
higher value investment in industry from firms in 
the EU. 
Assessed against these expectations – both 
accession prospects and extra investment in 
industry – CEFTA has failed to be rewarded by 
the EU. In contrast to the original members of 
CEFTA – the Visegrad countries – it is striking just 
how minor the presence of bigger (and especially 
German) multinationals is in the Western 
Balkans.16 Although the ‘new’ CEFTA countries 
generally receive a similar level of FDI relative 
to their GDP as the Visegrad countries, this 
reflects the much lower GDP levels of the CEFTA 
countries, and the type of FDI received by CEFTA 
is of a notably lower quality (Hunya et al. 2017). 
Fiat-Chrysler is perhaps the only genuine top-
16 This is important, not least because the big multinationals 
tend to drive a high share of productivity growth and are the 
main source of technology transfer in CEE countries. 
Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA)
The ‘new’ CEFTA15 included the Western Balkan 
Six countries, Moldova and three other CEE 
states that would later join the EU and therefore 
leave the CEFTA (i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania). The importance of regional economic 
integration in the context of preparing for future 
EU membership was recognised in the preamble 
to the new agreement. 
The ‘new’ CEFTA came into force in 2007 and 
formed a free trade zone between its members, 
with 32 previous bilateral agreements being 
replaced by a single multilateral agreement. 
It aimed to rebuild the regional market by 
facilitating intraregional trade, but it also 
contained provisions on promoting and 
protecting intraregional FDI. Among CEFTA’s 
priorities was overall trade facilitation, which 
especially comprised investment, transparency, 
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, and arbitration for 
resolving disputes among members. 
In our econometric exercise, we find that CEFTA 
was much more significant for intraregional trade 
than the previous FTAs implemented by the 
Western Balkan countries. Its entry into force 
was associated with a 37.7 percent increase in 
exports. However, Serbia again seems to have a 
special place in our results. When we remove it 
from the sample, the positive impact of CEFTA 
on intraregional trade increases to nearly 70 
percent.
This result indicates two things: First, all else 
being equal, and as with the FTAs, CEFTA did not 
have that much of an impact on trade between 
Serbia and the rest of the Western Balkan 
countries. The diversion of Serbian exports to the 
15 The original CEFTA had been created in 1992 and involved 
only the Visegrad countries; hence the name, which makes 
less sense for a collection of countries mostly in Southeast 
Europe. 
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public procurement, legislative ‘approximation’ 
(including standardisation), and provisions 
for services. Furthermore, along with Turkey, 
the Western Balkan countries participate in 
a system of ‘diagonal cumulation’ of origin. 
This allows exporters in any of the partners 
to the agreement to use materials from any 
other partner to then manufacture goods to be 
exported to the Western Balkans, Turkey or the 
EU. All Western Balkan countries now apply 
the same rules of origin. Since 2000, the EU has 
granted autonomous trade preferences to all 
Western Balkan countries. Almost all Western 
Balkan exports enter the EU on this basis 
without customs duties or quantity limits (with 
the exceptions being sugar, wine, veal and some 
fishery products).
It is difficult to separate out intraregional trade 
and investment developments from the broader 
integration of the Western Balkans with the 
EU. In this context, we also looked at the impact 
of the SAAs on trade, investment and broader 
economic developments in the region. All 
Western Balkan Six countries now have such an 
agreement in place.17 We find that the existence 
of SAAs has had a positive impact on inward 
FDI flows and exports for the Western Balkan 
countries. However, the impact on the former is 
much more significant than on the latter. 
For countries with an SAA in place (including 
both Western Balkan and non-Western Balkan 
countries), all else being equal, the inward FDI 
stock from the EU is 41.9 percent higher than for 
countries without such an agreement.18 For the 
Western Balkans alone, the impact is even higher, 
at 46.2 percent.
17 Starting with North Macedonia (in force since 2004), Albania 
(2009), Montenegro (2010), Serbia (2013), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2015) and, finally, Kosovo (2016).
18 Splitting the Western Balkan countries off from the rest, we 
found that the coefficients are similar in size, with a slightly 
stronger relationship between SAAs and FDI for the Western 
Balkan countries than for the other ones.
tier EU multinational with a visible presence in 
the Western Balkans, whereas there are many in 
the Visegrad countries. This can be interpreted as 
indicating that CEFTA has failed to overcome the 
key barriers to greater multinational investment 
(specifically in small national markets), and that 
the regional market does not function especially 
well.
Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs)
When the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP) for Western Balkan countries was launched 
in June 1999, there were hopes that it would 
pave the way for eventual EU accession. The EU 
designated the Western Balkans as ‘potential 
members’ at the Feira Council in 2000, and 
Croatia and North Macedonia signed the first of 
the EU’s SAAs with the region in 2001. In these 
years, the SAP became the main instrument of 
EU relations with the Western Balkans, and all 
countries of the region invested more energy into 
EU accession and less into cooperation with each 
other. The 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, during 
which the EU reaffirmed the Western Balkans’ 
‘European perspective’, was another move in the 
direction of the ‘hub and spoke’ model. In 2003, 
Albania started to negotiate an SAA. In the same 
year, Croatia became the first SAA country to 
submit an application to join the EU, followed by 
North Macedonia in 2004. By this point (at the 
latest), it was clear that EU accession would be a 
multi-speed process for the region. 
The SAAs provide for free trade in goods as well 
as quite liberalised conditions for investment. 
Article 12 of the SAAs provide for cooperation 
in labour and capital mobility, business 
establishment rights between SAA signatories, 
and the liberalisation of trade in services. 
Along with free trade provisions, the SAAs also 
cover competition, protection of intellectual 
property rights, and enhanced cooperation in 
customs matters. They also include rules on 
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These strong and positive results for FDI inflows 
are unsurprising given the free movement of 
capital in the EU as well as the comparatively high 
level of investment protection. The SAAs provide 
some assurance to foreign investors that the 
country is on its way to EU membership, and their 
implementation can be perceived by investors 
as a sign of strong willingness to implement all 
the reforms required to become an EU member. 
These include fully liberalising capital flows and 
securing a high level of rule of law in general 
(including on important issues such as property 
rights and investment protection). FDI interest 
may also have been influenced by the availability 
of acquisition opportunities in the host countries, 
for example through privatisation as part of the 
post-communist transition process.19 
We also found that having an SAA or European 
Agreement20 in force had a clearly positive 
impact on external trade. In fact, exports to the 
EU from a country with an SAA or European 
Agreement were 70 percent higher than would 
otherwise have been the case. This reflects the 
strong reduction in trade barriers during the 
accession process, accompanied by other reforms 
potentially improving the competitiveness of 
countries with SAAs in force. It also reflects the 
scale and wealth of the EU market relative to 
those of individual transition countries. However, 
the impact for the Western Balkans, while still 
positive, was not as strong as for the sample 
overall. We find that SAAs have led on average 
to a 24.6 percent increase in exports for the 
Western Balkan countries.21 
19 As stated for the Western Balkans by, for example, Botrić 
(2010) or Estrin and Uvalic (2014).
20 These were agreements between the EU and the countries 
from CEE that joined in 2004 and 2007.
21 This positive and significant coefficient of the SAA variable 
for the Western Balkan countries is in line with the findings of 
Reiter and Stehrer (2018).
V.2 Infrastructure
In this section, we will address the infrastructure 
element of the EU strategy. As was the case for 
trade and investment, we want to look both at 
what was done and at the impact that it had. 
In this section, we will also address how the 
EU strategy complemented or was affected by 
infrastructure investments from other players, 
especially those of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and China. 
Overview of the EU’s strategy and 
its key steps
The Western Balkans have long faced substantial 
financing constraints, which reflects, among other 
factors, their political instability, an often-narrow 
tax base and weak economic growth. Thus, for 
the funding of large-scale infrastructure projects, 
the region has been and continues to be greatly 
dependent on international initiatives. Foreign 
governments and international institutions 
have been initiating a myriad of infrastructure 
investments in the Western Balkans since the late 
1990s (Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski 2015). While 
there were some collaborations launched by 
the countries in the region in the initial postwar 
period, Jacobsen (2005) argues that they were 
“limited to declarations that actually amount to 
little more than exercises in goodwill”. Not a lot 
has changed since then, and regional cooperation 
initiatives are still mainly driven by external 
players (Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski 2015).
The EU’s approach to the region has been 
characterised by a ‘stability via connectivity’ 
philosophy. Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski (2015) also 
conclude that regional cooperation facilitated by 
infrastructure projects is very popular in the EU 
and the region. In addition to positive impulses 
for the economy, it also brings political benefits 
for domestic politicians. The South East Europe 
Transport Observatory (SEETO) was established 
in 2004, and the Energy Community in 2005. 
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requiring all to agree. These developments have 
received support from EU programmes, such as 
the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 
programme. Starting in 2007, these efforts have 
been coordinated under the Instrument for Pre-
accession Assistance (IPA), which includes the 
provision of financial aid with a specific regional 
cooperation aspect under both ‘component I’ 
(transition assistance and institutional building) 
and ‘component II’ (cross-border cooperation). 
Since 2007, official candidate countries (Albania, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and 
Turkey) and partly potential candidates (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo) have been eligible 
to receive IPA funding. Country-specific IPA 
grants allocated to the region amounted to 
around EUR 3.8 billion in the 2007–2013 period 
and EUR 4.2 billion in the 2014–2020 period. 
Countries generally received the equivalent of 
0.5 to 1 percent of GDP per year, or a bit more 
in the case of Kosovo (1.3 to 2 percent). Around 
one-quarter of these funds are earmarked for 
infrastructure projects. In general, this amount 
is significantly lower than the one for the EU 
member states of CEE. 
Western Balkan Investment 
Framework (WBIF)
To maximise the impact of the IPA’s infrastructure 
funding, grants are usually blended with 
loans from IFIs through the Western Balkan 
Investment Framework (WBIF). The WBIF is a 
joint initiative between the EU, several IFIs23 
and bilateral donors to support infrastructure 
and private-sector development in the region. 
For each country, so-called national investment 
23 The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the World Bank.
Together with the European Common Aviation 
Area, they can be viewed as the main regional 
institutions that have fostered infrastructure 
projects in the energy and transport sector. 
The inception of SEETO in 2004 was a 
consequence of the EU’s efforts to establish 
the ‘indicative extension’ of the Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) to the 
Western Balkans. Its objective was to promote 
cooperation in the development of a multimodal 
network. Furthermore, it fosters cooperation 
in the harmonisation of the transport sector 
with the EU acquis, enhances local capacity for 
its implementation, collects data and produces 
analysis of investment programmes. A list of 
priority infrastructure projects suggested by 
SEETO was signed in 2015 and 2017 (Holzner 
and Schwarzhappel 2018). In order to deepen 
the integration of the Western Balkan region 
with the EU transport market, the Transport 
Community Treaty was signed between the EU 
and the Western Balkans in 2017. As a result, the 
Transport Community superseded SEETO in an 
effort to implement common standards as well as 
to improve network efficiency and safety. 
The Energy Community22 was set up in 2006 to 
develop a South East Europe Regional Energy 
Market (SEEREM) with the aim of having it 
ultimately form part of the wider European 
energy market (Kennedy and Besant-Jones 
2004). Its main objective is to coordinate the 
implementation and monitoring of the adoption 
of EU standards in the electricity market. 
The Energy Community Secretariat’s annual 
implementation report is one of its instruments 
for assessing the progress made by each 
contracting party in the various energy sectors. 
Various infrastructure cooperation projects 
were initiated in the early 2000s, including ones 
that permit smaller groups of Western Balkan 
countries to cooperate on projects rather than 
22 In addition to the Western Balkans, this also includes Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine as contracting parties.
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In December 2017, the WBIF included digital 
infrastructure as an additional key sector. In 
this respect, the WBIF will mainly support the 
deployment of digital infrastructure through 
technical assistance and the preparation of 
investment projects. The priorities are to connect 
‘white zones’ (i.e. areas without access to a 
broadband network) and rural areas as well as 
to improve digital connectivity of educational, 
healthcare, municipal and governmental 
institutions. Since then, the WBIF has approved 
digital infrastructure projects (mainly broadband 
development) in each of the Western Balkan 
countries, though none of these projects has 
reached the implementation phase yet.
Since the WBIF started operating in 2008, the 
overall volume of loans granted to the region has 
increased considerably. Measured in terms of the 
total worth of the loans granted, the WBIF has 
now become the largest investor in the region. 
Levitin and Sanfey (2018) point out that the 
WBIF has become the main tool for financing 
regional cooperation projects, particularly those 
involving infrastructure. Between 2008 and 
2018, approximately two-thirds of all the projects 
receiving funding aimed at improving intra- and 
interregional connectivity. Developments in road, 
rail, gas and electricity networks constitute the 
largest share of WBIF cross-border projects.
Berlin Process 
The Berlin Process, initiated by Germany in 2014, 
is an intergovernmental initiative linked to the 
future accession of the Western Balkan Six to 
the EU. Two of its main objectives are to intensify 
regional cooperation and to increase prosperity 
through sustainable economic growth. The latter 
is expected to be achieved via strengthened 
transport and energy infrastructure as well as 
the more efficient use of EU pre-accession funds 
(Holzner 2016).
committees24 identify a list of priority projects. If 
the project’s assessment process is successful, it 
is supported by an investment loan by one of the 
participating IFIs and blended with IPA grants, 
either for technical support or in the form of an 
investment grant.
Between the establishment of the WBIF in 2008 
and the end of 2019, 229 projects were planned 
and supported by EUR 1.3 billion in grants as 
well as potential loans worth around EUR 13 
billion. Together, these are expected to mobilise 
more than EUR 21.2 billion in investments after 
the implementation of all the projects (roughly 
20 percent of the combined 2019 GDP of the 
Western Balkan Six countries). However, the 
respective contribution of WBIF projects that 
are completed or in the implementation phase 
to national economies varies substantially. 
Investments triggered by WBIF projects as a 
share of domestic investment25 range from 
around 1.1 percent in Kosovo and 1.5 percent in 
Albania to 7.1 percent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Nevertheless, these differences can largely be 
attributed to the fact that many projects are still 
in the planning phase. This is particularly the 
case in Albania and Kosovo, where only 26 and 
18 percent of the projects, respectively, have 
reached the implementation phase. 
In its first two years, the WBIF granted 
sizeable loans to finance the construction of 
the indicative extension of TEN-T roads. More 
recently, the focus has shifted to rail, renewable 
energies and pipelines. For example, some 
major projects include ones related to sections 
of the Mediterranean and Orient/East-Med 
rail and inland/waterway corridor, the Cebren 
hydropower plant in North Macedonia, the 
Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) and an upgrade of 
the Port of Belgrade.
24 These are usually composed of line ministries, other central 
non-ministerial institutions, bilateral donors, the European 
Commission and the IFIs (as observers).
25 Cumulative gross fixed capital formation from 2008 to 2020; 
source: Eurostat.
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Interaction between the EU and 
other infrastructure investors in  
the region
Fully separating out the EU’s infrastructure 
strategy, initiatives and even funding in the 
Western Balkans from that of other players is not 
always easy. Especially in recent years, both IFIs 
and China have become increasingly important 
players in regional infrastructure financing, 
which has important implications for the EU’s 
connectivity goals. 
From the EU’s perspective, the involvement 
of IFIs has been broadly positive, as they have 
played a crucial role in supporting the EU’s 
strategy of ‘stabilisation through connectivity’. 
As mentioned above, IFIs are also an essential 
pillar of the WBIF in that they allow the EU 
to leverage its IPA funds. But even before the 
launch of the WBIF, IFIs played a crucial role in 
financing reconstruction, modernising existing 
infrastructure and financing new initiatives in 
this field. This was necessary owing to the often-
narrow fiscal space of local governments and 
political instability. 
The various IFIs active in the region have 
generally had different objectives. For example, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) focuses on supporting a 
country’s transition to a market economy. The 
European Investment Bank’s (EIB) main activities 
lie in financing large infrastructure projects 
and developing national financial markets. 
The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), 
Germany’s state-owned development bank, 
targets energy, water and waste projects. And 
the World Bank particularly concentrates on 
institution-building and supporting the creation 
of functioning electricity grids. 
Thus, while the IFIs’ strategies are rarely based 
specifically on an attempt to foster regional 
cooperation, many of the projects they have 
supported have contributed to improved 
In order to support this initiative, the European 
Commission announced the Connectivity 
Agenda in 2015 and set aside an extra EUR 1 
billion from EU pre-accession funds, which in 
turn are is supposed to leverage a total of EUR 
4 billion in key infrastructure investments. 
Priority infrastructure projects related to the 
Connectivity Agenda have generally been signed 
during the annual Western Balkan Summits. 
Between 2015 and the end of the summit held 
in Poznan in July 2019, EUR 881 million in 
grants had been pledged under the Connectivity 
Agenda. So far, the Connectivity Agenda has had 
a bias towards transport infrastructure, both in 
terms of the number of projects (32 transport, 
7 energy) and the financing volumes. However, 
as Holzner (2016) notes, EUR 1 billion in grants 
between 2015 and 2019 for co-financing 
infrastructure projects is rather modest when 
compared to the EU’s structural funds. For 
example, Romania, whose population is almost as 
big as those of the Western Balkan Six combined, 
has had access to funds for transport and energy 
infrastructure that were six times as large for a 
similar period of time. 
Another initiative that has also been pushed 
during Western Balkan Summits and is strongly 
related to infrastructure and connectivity is the 
Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans, which 
was launched at the Digital Assembly held in 
Sofia in 2018. However, the scope of the Digital 
Agenda is rather limited, as only around EUR 30 
million in EU grants were made available under 
the WBIF to deploy broadband infrastructure. 
In addition to improvements in the national 
broadband networks, the participating countries 
also endorsed a roadmap to reduce roaming 
charges within the region as well as between the 
region and the EU. 
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by the IFIs, it is impossible to gauge the total 
investment triggered during this same period. 
However, since loans are usually accompanied by 
national co-financing, the overall impact on total 
investment is presumably a lot larger than what 
is depicted. So far, Kosovo has enjoyed relatively 
few benefits from IFIs, which might be due to its 
difficult international status and relatively late 
membership in the IFIs. Overall, it appears that 
IFIs rather than national investors have financed 
the largest share of infrastructure investment in 
the region.26
26 Reliable and comprehensive data on infrastructure 
investment in the region is not available. However, our own 
simplified calculations suggest that loans provided by the 
EIB, EBRD, KfW and the World Bank covered at least half and 
perhaps as much as 70 percent of infrastructure investment 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia between 
2002 and 2017.
connectivity and thereby, at least indirectly, to 
the EU’s goal of stabilising the region through 
regional cooperation. What’s more, they have 
mobilised significant resources. Between 2000 
and 2019, the World Bank, the EBRD, the EIB, 
the KfW and the Council of Europe Development 
Bank (CEB) together approved more than EUR 
32 billion in loans for the Western Balkans. 
While the IFIs’ projects related to transport 
have focused almost exclusively on building and 
modernising road infrastructure, more funding 
has gone to rail-infrastructure projects since 
2013. 
Figure V.1 shows that the loans approved and 
signed by IFIs made up between 4 and 13 percent 
of the total gross fixed capital formation of the 
Western Balkan countries between 2000 and 
2020. Due to a lack of comparable data provided 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
SerbiaNorth 
Macedonia
MontenegroKosovoBosnia and 
Herzegovina
Albania
WBIFWorld BankKfWEIBEBRDCEB
FIGURE V.1  Loans granted by lending institutions and countries, as a percentage of cumulative GFCF, 2000–2020
Sources: EBRD, World Bank, EIB, WBIF, KfW, wiiw Annual Database.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
Note: This chart shows loans granted by the respective lending institutions. The WBIF does not issue loans itself; all loans channelled through WBIF are 
issued by the respective IFIs. Only projects that have been completed since 2000 or have been signed since 2000 are included. Thus, some projects are still 
in the preparation or implementation phase. GFCF for 2020 is predicted based on the 2018/19 GFCF growth rate, and GFCF for Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is calculated for the 2000–2003 period based on GDP growth rates. GFCF = Gross Fixed Capital Formation.
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and gas infrastructure linked to the Trans-
European Networks for Energy (TEN-E). On the 
other hand, non-cross-border infrastructure 
encompasses projects related to transport, 
energy, environment, telecommunication, 
water and waste that do not directly link two 
countries. Such projects include sewage and 
waste, electricity generation, and local transport 
and electricity infrastructure. Non-infrastructure 
projects mainly consist of credit lines to the 
private sector and to public-sector development, 
meaning that they also include health and 
education facilities. 
The other major player in the region in terms of 
infrastructure investment is China, albeit only in 
recent years. The Western Balkans constitute an 
important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), a huge programme of infrastructure 
development designed to export excess capacity 
and increase control of supply routes between 
Figure V.2 also highlights the success that the 
WBIF has had since its inception in 2008. While 
IFIs issued loans worth on average around EUR 
1 billion per year between 2000 and 2007, 
this amount increased substantially beginning 
in 2008. Thus, it appears that the WBIF has 
significantly boosted the IFIs’ activity in the 
region.
We also classify all infrastructure projects co-
financed by IFIs as being either cross-border 
or non-cross-border.27 On average, a bit more 
than a quarter of these projects have met the 
cross-border criteria since 2000. Cross-border 
projects are mainly comprised of transport 
infrastructure linked to the TEN-T or electricity 
27 Projects are labelled as ‘cross-border’ if the intention is to 
improve or create a direct link between two countries (or 
two ethnic regions in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
While improved local infrastructure networks may eventually 
lead to better connectivity, they are classified as ‘non-cross-
border’ in our exercise. 
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FIGURE V.2  IFI loans to the Western Balkans, by type, in EUR m
Source: Own calculations based on information from IFI websites (EIB, EBRD, KfW, World Bank).  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw. 
Note: Projects are labelled as cross-border if the intention is to improve or create a link between two countries (or two ethnic regions in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). This includes roads and railways, electricity lines and pipelines that connect two regions.
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separate study included Montenegro among 
eight countries at ‘high risk’ of encountering 
debt problems associated with BRI loans (Hurley, 
Morris and Portelance 2018). In extreme cases, 
this can lead to asset seizures by China (as 
happened in the case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota 
Port in 2017).
Third, Chinese investment raises concerns about 
public procurement, potential corruption and 
environmental standards. From the Chinese 
perspective, aside from its location, the Western 
Balkans have the added advantage of not 
being part of the EU, meaning that there are 
less stringent rules on public procurement and 
environmental standards. In fact, it won’t be 
easy for a liberal, highly regulated and rules-
based organisation like the EU to work with 
China on investment issues. Given the EU’s 
climate goals, the Paris Climate Agreement and 
the region’s poor air quality, in particular, the 
Western Balkans are under pressure to move 
away from using its coal-fired power plants. 
Nevertheless, five out of 11 Chinese energy 
infrastructure investments in Serbia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have involved building new or 
upgrading existing coal-fired power plants. 
Impact of the EU’s strategy on 
transport infrastructure and 
connectivity 
Positive developments can be seen in transport 
connectivity, including integration into the Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) through 
road and rail investment. This generally positive 
picture reflects the fact that, as described above, 
transport infrastructure and connectivity (and 
roads, in particular) have been a key focus not 
only of EU investment, but also of that from IFIs 
and, more recently, of China. According to OECD 
data, in some years, more than 90 percent of 
total transport infrastructure investment in the 
Western Balkans has been channelled towards 
new or improved road networks. The overall 
China and its main markets. The Western Balkans 
are located between the Greek port of Piraeus (of 
which China acquired a controlling stake in 2016) 
and the major markets of Western Europe. 
Between 2007 and 2017, (announced) Chinese 
construction projects linked to the BRI in CEE 
amounted to over EUR 12 billion, according 
to wiiw calculations (Grieveson, Grübler and 
Holzner 2018). Such projects are predominantly 
in the Western Balkans, with around 30 percent 
of the total going to Serbia, 20.7 percent to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 7.4 percent 
to Montenegro. These volumes are at least 
comparable to EU funding for infrastructure in 
the region, and dwarf anything committed by 
Russia or Turkey. 
The Chinese focus on infrastructure development 
and the Western Balkans’ infrastructure needs 
therefore represent what could be a win-win 
situation, and it can be argued that it fits in to 
a certain extent with the EU’s broad agenda. 
Holzner, Heimberger and Kochnev (2018) point 
out that there are potential synergies between 
the EU’s Connectivity Agenda and China’s BRI, 
particularly in the transport sector. 
However, this is far from always the case for 
three main reasons. First, China is investing 
according to its own priorities and on its own 
terms. Although these often overlap with the 
Connectivity Agenda and the overall aims of 
regional cooperation, this does not apply across 
the board and there is no guarantee that this 
overlap will persist over the long term.
Second, it raises serious risks regarding public 
debt. Since Chinese infrastructure funds only 
come in the form of loans, they may unsustainably 
increase the debt burdens of some countries 
in the region. Indeed, especially in the cases of 
Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
IMF has warned that the scale of the increase in 
debt (on top of an already quite high debt load 
for these countries) could create problems. A 
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for infrastructure has increased substantially in 
Kosovo, the country is a laggard when it comes to 
several connectivity initiatives. This is in part due 
to the fact that many countries (including some 
in the EU) still do not recognise its sovereignty, 
which might make it more difficult for Kosovo to 
cooperate in international initiatives than it is for 
other countries in the region.
It must be said, however, that not all of the 
success in improving transport infrastructure 
can be attributed to regional cooperation 
initiatives. More recently, Chinese investment 
has led to some further improvements in regional 
transport connectivity and, in the transport 
sector, Chinese investors are providing funding 
for large TEN-T projects. For example, a section 
of the so-called Corridor XI that links the Port of 
Bar on Montenegro’s Adriatic coast to Belgrade 
is being implemented by China Communication 
Construction Company and partially financed 
umbrella of regional cooperation has played an 
important role in this, and the EU’s TEN-T and the 
respective integration into the local transport 
system have been important in catalysing and 
implementing new infrastructure projects. The 
value of transport infrastructure investment 
(excluding maintenance) was equivalent to 
around 2 percent of GDP in 2017 in Albania, 
North Macedonia and Serbia and, since 2013, 
it has generally been much higher than in peer 
countries (Figure V.3). 
Meanwhile, the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey 
has revealed that around 10 percent of all firms 
in the Western Balkans claimed that transport 
infrastructure was a major constraint in the 
2007–2009 period, and that this percentage 
decreased for all countries (except Kosovo) until 
2019. In Kosovo, 37 percent considered transport 
to be a major constraint in 2019 compared to 
only 8 percent in 2009. While business demand 
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FIGURE V.3  Investment in road infrastructure, as a percentage of GDP
Sources: International Transport Forum (OECD), Eurostat.  |   |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
Note: Data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are not available; EU-SEE average = simple average of Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia.
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and particularly contribute to road, rail and 
renewable-energy infrastructure.
Impact of the EU’s strategy 
on energy infrastructure and 
connectivity 
In addition to transport infrastructure, the impact 
of EU and other international investment on the 
energy sector has also been quite large. Since 
2000, most of the Western Balkan countries have 
significantly expanded their capacity to generate 
electricity. According to Eurostat data, between 
2000 and 2017, Serbia boosted its capacity by 
more than 150 percent, Albania and Kosovo by 
50 percent, North Macedonia by 26 percent, 
and Montenegro by 6 percent. What’s more, 
actual gross electricity production has increased 
relatively more since 2000. 
by a loan from the Export-Import Bank of China 
(EXIM China). Furthermore, the modernisation  
of the railway link between Belgrade and 
Budapest is being partially funded by loans from 
the same bank, and the new port in Belgrade is 
also going to be financed by China Environmental 
Energy Holdings.28 Thus, in the context of 
transport infrastructure, Chinese investments 
have contributed significantly to the region’s 
connectivity. 
Figure V.4 compares the Chinese sectoral 
focus to WBIF investment, which has a strong 
connectivity-enhancing objective. As the chart 
shows, Chinese investors are particularly 
prominent in the transport and (non-renewable) 
energy sectors. However, the European 
WBIF projects are more important overall 
28 For more details on Chinese investments in the region, see 
https://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/see-
china-investments.pdf.
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Another way to assess improvements in the 
electricity grid and the connectivity between 
countries, in particular, is to look at the trade 
in electricity. While it is clear that many factors 
determine the extent of electricity trade between 
countries, it provides an indication of whether 
countries possess the required infrastructure and 
cooperate across borders to connect the national 
grid to neighbouring countries. Figure V.5 shows 
that, on average, there is a positive trend towards 
increased electricity trade (imports and exports). 
Kosovo and Albania have decreased their 
trade recently, partly thanks to their increased 
capacities and therefore lower need for imports. 
China has also played an important role in 
financing the development of the energy 
sector. However, in contrast to the transport 
sector, Chinese investment has contributed 
relatively little to connect the region’s electricity 
networks. As shown in Figure V.4 above, Chinese 
investment in the energy sector has mainly 
Major progress has also been made in integrating 
the Western Balkans into the Trans-European 
Energy Networks (TEN-E), mainly through 
electricity generation and distribution and the 
construction of gas pipelines. Improvements in 
energy connectivity appear particularly strong in 
Kosovo and Albania, where the number of firms 
that reported electricity as a major constraint 
substantially declined between 2009 and 2019, 
according to the World Bank. This trend has also 
been confirmed by the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Index, presented in 
Figure V.7 below, which shows that (at least 
recently) the quality of electricity infrastructure 
in Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania does not 
compare too badly. At least on this measure, 
electricity infrastructure in the Western Balkans 
also seems to be of a higher standard than other 
types of infrastructure in the region. However, 
power outages still remain a big problem in 
the region, especially in Albania, Kosovo and 
Montenegro. 
North MacedoniaMontenegroBosnia and HerzegovinaAlbania Kosovo Serbia
Regional average
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
201720162015201420132012201120102009200820072006200520042003200220012000
FIGURE V.5  Trade in electricity, as a percentage of final consumption
Source: Eurostat. |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  |  Note: Trade with rest of the world measured as sum of exports and imports.
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better than the rest. What’s more, as discussed 
earlier in this study, one the reasons why Western 
Balkan states lag behind the EU member states 
in Eastern Europe is the different access to EU 
funds. 
In order to quantify the infrastructure investment 
required to fill these gaps, the EBRD (2017) 
conducted an econometric exercise and used 
its results to compare the current state of 
infrastructure in the Western Balkans to that of 
a benchmark group of advanced economies. The 
results, depicted in Figure V.6, reveal that the 
required investments are still large and would 
require average annual expenditures ranging in 
value from 8 to 12 percent of GDP. This is two to 
three times as high as in other Eastern European 
countries as well as roughly three times the 
current infrastructure investment spending in  
the region.
The indicators estimated by the IMF and EBRD 
highlight that the efforts of the last 20 years have 
been insufficient to converge to the levels of 
other CEE countries. Various areas of deficiency 
can be identified. 
First, motorway densities29 are still low, and 
existing road infrastructure is often of poor 
quality, which makes it a continued impediment 
to trade and participation in regional and global 
value chains. The EBRD estimates identified 
that more than half of the required investment 
is needed for maintenance and replacement. 
Thus, the establishment of comprehensive 
maintenance systems is a key issue that will need 
to be addressed. 
Second, railway density and the quality of railway 
infrastructure is even more concerning than 
with roads. Figure V.7 shows that, on average, 
the quality of railways is the worst relative to 
that of other infrastructure. Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia, in particular, lack well-
29 Details can be found in Cingolani, Berthomieu and Ri (2017), 
EBRD (2017), and Holzner and Grieveson (2018).
focused on the generation of electricity from non-
renewable sources. The energy projects receiving 
funding exclusively involve (environmentally 
questionable) coal- and gas-fired power stations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Since this 
conflicts with the EU’s climate goals, it could 
create problems for these countries during the 
EU accession process. 
Persistent gaps and challenges 
ahead
In recent years, efforts to improve the state of 
infrastructure have made progress in most areas. 
However, one can argue that the transport, 
electricity and ICT sectors in the region generally 
lag behind relative to those in other, more 
advanced regional peers. To date, investments 
have failed to deliver a quick catch-up, and 
the lack of infrastructure continues to hinder 
economic development and regional integration. 
The development of a comprehensive national 
and cross-border infrastructure network that 
meets high quality and environmental standards 
is a gradual process and faces many financial and 
political constraints. The fact that substantial 
efforts by the EU, IFIs and other international 
investors over the last 20 years have only 
resulted in limited progress shows that the 
process is slow-going and faces many obstacles. 
Both the IMF and the EBRD have identified 
large infrastructure gaps in the Western Balkans 
that will require substantial investment. The 
IMF’s Infrastructure Gap Index aggregates 
national infrastructure indicators and compares 
them to the EU average. It shows that most of 
the Western Balkan region suffers from poor 
infrastructure not only compared to the EU 
average, but also relative to Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Romania, which were the latest countries to 
become members of the EU and whose state of 
economic development was similar to a certain 
extent before EU accession. Within the Western 
Balkan region, Serbia seems to be doing slightly 
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Kosovo (Figure V.8). Despite the commonly 
agreed objective to form a regional electricity 
market, the weak implementation of institutional 
and regulatory reforms inhibits fast progress. 
The Energy Community noted in its Annual 
Implementation Report (2018: 8) that “many 
important elements of the acquis have been 
superficially implemented in some Contracting 
Parties at best”. Bechev, Ejdus and Taleski (2015) 
argue that publically owned businesses in the 
energy sector and price regulations, which often 
serve as a social policy measure, slow down or 
inhibit necessary reforms to forge a functioning 
regional electricity market.
Fourth, the region faces some serious challenges 
in transitioning to cleaner energy. This matters 
not only in terms of reducing coal dependency 
for environmental reasons, but also in terms 
of decentralising the electricity grid in order 
to enable such a transition to renewable 
energies. Coal-fired power plants account for 
more than half of the production in Bosnia and 
maintained railway infrastructures. This is not 
surprising given that public expenditure for such 
infrastructure barely exists. Moreover, the WBIF 
and Chinese investors have prioritised road 
infrastructure in the past and have only recently 
started to channel more resources towards 
this area. So far, the only exception is Serbia, 
whose investments in its rail infrastructure 
have increased substantially since 2014.30 
However, in the last few years, large rail projects 
along the Orient/East-Med Corridor and the 
Mediterranean Corridor have been signed 
in all countries. Thus, investment in railway 
infrastructure is expected to pick up significantly 
in the region. 
Third, although significant progress has been 
made in developing electricity-transmission 
infrastructure, outages and electricity loss due 
to poor distribution infrastructure (and theft) 
remain prevalent, particularly in Albania and 
30 No data are available for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and North Macedonia.
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FIGURE V.8  Distribution losses, as a percentage of gross electricity production, 2017
Source: Eurostat.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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Tackling these issues is easier said than done. 
The reasons for the persistent deficiencies are 
complex, and there are no easy solutions in many 
cases. Below, we outline three key priority areas 
to be tackled.
First, the general problem of financing 
remains. Even allowing for the Connectivity 
Agenda, grants available for Western Balkan 
infrastructure investment appear set to remain 
quite limited compared with those available to  
EU members from structural funds. 
Second, corruption is a challenge. As Bechev, 
Ejdus and Taleski (2015) highlight, there have 
already been high-profile cases of corruption. The 
contract for the ‘Patriotic Highway’ linking Tirana 
and Pristina, which was awarded to a consortium 
of Bechtel and Turkey’s ENKA, received criticism 
for failing to comply with tendering regulations. 
In addition, China’s arrival brings significant 
additional risk of corruption. Such cases could limit 
any benefits arising from improved connectivity. 
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia, and projects in 
Kosovo and Serbia are expected to increase coal 
dependency. Meanwhile, the Energy Community 
Secretariat’s annual implementation report 
(Energy Community 2018) also points out that 
decentralised generation and consumption 
patterns based on renewable energy sources 
are likely to replace the current centralised 
architecture. Thus, new investment in the energy 
sector should be compatible with low-emission 
objectives and developments in the renewable 
energy sector. 
Finally, investment in the region’s ICT 
infrastructure has so far been mostly neglected. 
The EU’s Digital Agenda was only signed in 
2018 and, to date, only EUR 30 million has 
been provided through the WBIF for technical 
assistance. Fixed broadband subscriptions are 
generally lower than in EU member states in SEE 
(Figure V.9). This may limit companies’ business 
opportunities and hold back the e-commerce 
activities of both companies and individuals. 
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56
Pushing on a string?
REFERENCES
Bechev, Dimitar, Filip Ejdus and Dane Taleski (2015). 
Culture of Regional Cooperation in Southeast 
Europe. Background Paper. August 2015. Balkans 
in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BIEPAG).
Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès, Maylis Coupet and Thierry 
Mayer (2007). “Institutional determinants of 
foreign direct investment.” The World Economy 
(30) 5: 764–782.
Botrić, Valerija (2010). “Foreign Direct Investment 
in the Western Balkans: Privatization, 
institutional change, and banking sector 
dominance.” Economic Annals (60) 187: 7–30.
Christie, Edward (2001). Potential Trade in 
Southeast Europe: A Gravity Model Approach. 
wiiw Balkan Observatory Working Papers No. 11. 
Vienna: The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies. 
Cingolani, Massimo, Claude Berthomieu and 
Anastasia Ri (2017). Investment for growth 
and development in the Western Balkans. Nice: 
CEMAFI International.
Colen, Liesbeth, Damiaan Persyn and Andrea 
Guariso (2016). “Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and FDI: Does the Sector Matter?” World 
Development 83: 193–206.
Damijan, Joze P., Jose de Sousa and Olivier Lamotte 
(2009). “Does international openness affect the 
productivity of local firms? Evidence from south-
eastern Europe.” Economics of Transition (17) 3: 
559–586.
Desbordes, Rodolphe, and Vincent Vicard (2009). 
“Foreign direct investment and bilateral 
investment treaties: An international political 
perspective.” Journal of Comparative Economics 
(37) 3: 372–386.
Dixon, Jay, and Paul Alexander Haslam (2016). 
“Does the Quality of Investment Protection 
Affect FDI Flows to Developing Countries? 
Evidence from Latin America.” The World 
Economy (39) 8: 1080–1108. 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) (2017). Transition Report 
2017–18: Sustaining Growth. London: EBRD.
Third, physical infrastructure investment needs 
to be coordinated in tandem with ‘soft measures’. 
Moïsé and Le Bris (2013) conclude that high-
quality physical infrastructure has only limited 
effects on transport costs in the absence of 
efficient and competitive logistics services. 
The lack of competition might even be a bigger 
constraint for developing countries than physical 
infrastructure when it comes to achieving lower 
prices. Similarly, the creation and functioning of 
a regional energy market will only be successful 
if countries implement the regulatory and 
institutional reforms suggested by the Energy 
Community. Unfortunately, the implementation 
of such reforms is currently far from being 
fulfilled. The Energy Community Secretariat’s 
annual implementation report (Energy 
Community 2018) suggests that corruption 
and publicly owned businesses lead to delays 
and poor implementation. Thus, to reap the full 
benefits of infrastructure, incentives need to be 
created to implement ‘soft measures’. 
57
The EU strategy for economic integration: Implementation and results
Treaties and Free Trade Agreements in Regional 
Investment and Trade Flows. wiiw Research 
Report No. 445. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies.
Holzner, Mario (2016). Policy Options for 
Competitiveness and Economic Development 
in the Western Balkans: The Case for 
Infrastructure Investment. wiiw Policy Note/
Policy Report No. 16. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies.
Holzner, Mario, and Richard Grieveson (2018). 
Investment in the Western Balkans: New 
Directions and Financial Constraints in 
Infrastructure Investment. wiiw Policy Note/
Policy Report No. 27. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies.
Holzner, Mario, Philipp Heimberger and Artem 
Kochnev (2018). A ‘European Silk Road’. wiiw 
Research Report No. 430. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies.
Holzner, Mario, and Monika Schwarzhappel (2018). 
Infrastructure Investment in the Western 
Balkans: A First Analysis. wiiw Research Report 
No. 432. Vienna: The Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies.
Hunya, Gabor, Mahdi Ghodsi, Vladimir Gligorov, 
Richard Grieveson, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Mario 
Holzner and Roman Stöllinger (2017). CEFTA 
Investment Report 2017. Brussels: CEFTA 
Secretariat. 
Hurley, John, Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance 
(2018). Examining the Debt Implications of 
the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy 
Perspective. CGD Policy Paper 121, March 
2018. Washington, DC: Center for Global 
Development.
Jacobsen, Hanns-Dieter. Economic Security and the 
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Berlin: 
Studienforum Berlin.
Kaloyanchev, Plamen, Ivan Kusen and Alexandros 
Mouzakitis (2018). Untapped Potential: 
Intra-Regional Trade in the Western Balkans. 
European Economy Discussion Paper 080. 
Brussels: European Commission.
Egger, Peter, and Michael Pfaffermayr (2004). 
“The impact of bilateral investment treaties 
on foreign direct investment.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics (32) 4: 788–804.
Emerson, Michael (2005). An interim plan for South-
East Europe: Customs Union with the EU and 
a regional Schengen for the free movement of 
people. CEPS Policy Contribution, 1 November 
2005. Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS).
Energy Community (2018). Annual Implementation 
Report. Vienna: Energy Community Secretariat. 
Estrin, Saul, and Milica Uvalic (2014). “Foreign direct 
investment into transition economies: Are the 
Balkans different?” The Economics of Transition 
(22) 2: 281–312.
Frenkel, Michael, and Benedikt Walter (2018). “Do 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign 
Direct Investment? The Role of International 
Dispute Settlement Provisions.” The World 
Economy (42) 5: 1316–1342.
Gligorov, Vladimir (1998). Trade and Investment in 
the Balkans. wiiw Balkan Observatory. Vienna: 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies. 
Gligorov, Vladimir (2017). Macedonian Exports. wiiw 
Research Report No. 420. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies. 
Graebner, Claudius, Philipp Heimberger, Jakob 
Kapeller and Bernhard Schuetz (2018). 
Structural change in times of increasing 
openness: assessing path dependency in 
European economic integration. ICAE Working 
Paper Series No. 76. Institute for Comprehensive 
Analysis of the Economy, Johannes Kepler 
University Linz.
Grieveson, Richard, Julia Grübler and Mario 
Holzner (2018). Western Balkans EU Accession: 
Is the 2025 Target Date Realistic? wiiw Policy 
Note/Policy Report No. 22. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies.
Grieveson, Richard, Mario Holzner and Goran 
Vuksic (2020). Regional Cooperation in the 
Western Balkans: The Role of Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements, Bilateral Investment 
58
Pushing on a string?
Kennedy, David, and John Besant-Jones (2004). 
World Bank framework for development of 
regional energy trade in South East Europe. 
Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper 
Series No. 12. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Levitin, Oleg, and Peter Sanfey (2018). Regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans. London: 
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD).
Maur, Jean-Christophe, and Patrick Messerlin 
(2001). Which Free Trade Agreement in South 
Eastern Europe? Technical Report for the Working 
Group on Trade of the Stability Pact March 2001. 
Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and 
Facilitation. 
Moïsé, Evdokia, and Florian Le Bris (2013). Trade 
costs: What have we learned? A synthetic 
report. OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 150. Paris: 
OECD.
Petreski, Marjan (2018). “Has CEFTA Increased 
Members’ Mutual Trade? Evidence with 
an Enlarged Set of Plausibly Exogenous 
Instruments.” Czech Journal of Economics and 
Finance (68) 3: 293–316.
Petzina, Dietmar, Wolfgang F. Stolper and Michael 
Hudson (1981). The Origin of the European 
Coal and Steel Community: Economic Forces 
and Political Interests. Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft / Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics Bd. 137, H. 3. Economic 
Reconstruction in Europe: The Reintegration of 
Western Germany: A Symposium (September 
1981): 450–468.
Reiter, Oliver, and Robert Stehrer (2018). Trade 
Policies and Integration of the Western Balkans. 
wiiw Working Paper 148. Vienna: The Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies.
UNCTAD (2000). Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–
1999. New York and Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD (2007). Bilateral Investment Treaties 
1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking. 
New York and Geneva: United Nations.
59
Taking stock: The state of play in 2020
VI. Taking stock: The state of play in 2020
• Have governance challenges been overcome?
• What is the role of outside actors now?
•  What are the next steps for regional 
cooperation in an economic sense?
•  When it comes to greater regional economic 
integration, are the potential economic 
upsides greater and the barriers lower than 
they were before?
•  How big are the demographic challenges that 
the region faces?
Has the ‘geography of animosity’ 
been broken over the past 20 years?
In part owing to the sense of drift in the EU 
accession process identified in the introduction 
to this study, local Western Balkan initiatives 
have become more important in the past decade. 
This can be seen in many important initiatives, 
including the Regional Cooperation Council, the 
Western Balkans Six, the Multi-annual Action 
Plan for a Regional Economic Area, and the ‘mini-
Schengen’ idea.
As local ownership of the process has increased, 
citizens have become more engaged, and the 
level of support for regional cooperation in the 
Western Balkans has grown among citizens. 
In the Balkan Barometer 2019, the share of 
respondents who either ‘totally agree’ or ‘tend to 
Chapter V highlighted many successes in terms 
of driving trade, investment and infrastructure 
integration in the Western Balkans. Although 
one can admittedly identify many gaps and areas 
in need of improvement, it cannot be said that 
nothing has come out of this strategy in economic 
terms over the past two decades. Nevertheless, 
as outlined in the introduction to this paper, the 
point of this strategy has not just been to drive 
regional economic integration for its own sake, 
but also to use this increased connectivity and 
(hopefully) rising prosperity to have a direct and 
positive impact on the normalisation of political 
relations in the region.
In this chapter, we want to assess the situation in 
2020 and to ask to what extent the implementation 
of the EU’s regional cooperation strategy has 
fundamentally addressed the most important 
challenges that the region has and continues to 
face. We will do this in the context of the political, 
institutional and economic obstacles to regional 
cooperation set out in Chapter IV, asking to what 
extent these obstacles have been overcome. 
Specifically, in this chapter we will address the 
following questions:
•  Has the ‘geography of animosity’ been broken 
over the past 20 years?
•  Are the incentives for the Western Balkan 
countries to cooperate more aligned than 
they used to be?
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At the country level, only Albanians appear to 
be more supportive of EU membership than of 
regional cooperation.  
The same survey also implied that citizens in the 
region would like to see regional cooperation go 
even further. For example, 53 percent of Western 
Balkan respondents wanted commercial and 
trade links in Southeast Europe to be improved, 
while only 6 percent said they are already too 
strong. However, the survey also showed that 52 
percent felt ‘not informed at all’ about CEFTA, 
while only 13 percent said they were mostly or 
completely informed about it. 
Interregional connectivity in terms of the 
movement of people appears to be fairly strong. 
Citizens seem to travel around the region (Table 
VI.1) and to feel comfortable visiting other 
Western Balkan countries, although more 
trips continue to be made to ethnically and 
agree’ that regional cooperation can contribute 
to the political, economic or security situation 
of their society was 74 percent for the Western 
Balkans as a whole versus 20 percent who 
disagreed (Figure VI.1). The share of respondents 
in agreement ranged from 64 percent in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to 80 percent in both Serbia and 
Montenegro. 
Of course, this single question could obscure a 
multitude of understandings and motivations 
among respondents. For example, it does not 
probe what respondents would be willing to give 
up in return for enhanced regional cooperation. 
However, one thing appears clear: Citizens in the 
region support regional cooperation as a goal 
in itself rather than just as a way to secure EU 
membership. In fact, in the Western Balkans as 
a whole, the share of respondents who support 
regional cooperation is significantly higher than 
the share of those who support EU membership. 
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FIGURE VI.1   “Do you agree that regional cooperation can contribute to the political, economic or security situation of 
your society?” Percent of respondents
Source: Balkan Barometer 2019.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  |  Note: ‘Total disagree’ = sum of those answering ‘totally disagree’ and ‘tend to 
disagree’. ‘Total agree’ = sum of those answering ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’. Note SEE = Southeast Europe average
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border changes reflects the territorial disputes  
at the core of the geography of animosity. 
In August 2018, Serbian President Aleksandar 
Vucić and his Kosovan counterpart, Hashim 
Thaçi, announced that they were considering 
border changes as part of an agreement on 
the normalisation of relations. Influential 
international media sources, including the New 
York Times (Kupchan 2018) and the Financial 
Times (2018), added their support.
In practical terms, the idea of a territorial swap 
between Serbia and Kosovo is highly complex. 
First, this is because most ethnic Serbs in Kosovo 
live in the south of the country rather than in 
the north, which puts them farther away from 
Serbia. Therefore, even if the part of Kosovo 
directly adjacent to Serbia could be transferred 
from the former to the latter, this would not 
resolve the issue for the majority of Kosovan 
Serbs. If anything, this could further exacerbate 
the problem for these people (Joseph 2018). 
Second, the issue isn’t even straightforward for 
Serbs in northern Kosovo. As the ESI (2019) lays 
out, installing a new border through Mitrovica is 
highly impractical, as this is the most multi-ethnic 
urban part of Kosovo. 
These factors have not been lost on citizens in the 
region. Despite the positive aspects of regional 
linguistically similar countries. The most common 
trips involve Kosovans going to Albania and 
Montenegrins heading to Serbia (in both cases, 
32 percent of respondents from Kosovo and 
Montenegro had made these trips in the past 
year). On the other hand, the trips that hardly 
anyone makes are Bosnians to Albania or Kosovo 
and Kosovans to Bosnia. 
Meanwhile, among most respondents to the 
survey who travel to other cities in the region, 
more people feel comfortable everywhere rather 
than uncomfortable or only comfortable in some 
places (Figure VI.2). Only in Serbia was this not 
the case, as only 36 percent of respondents had 
positive feelings about people from other parts 
of the region coming to work in their economy, 
compared with 19 percent who reported having 
negative feelings. 
However, despite this reasonably positive picture, 
the impression from the actions of elites in the 
region is quite different. For many politicians in 
the Western Balkans, the geography of animosity 
is still present and manifests itself in territorial 
disputes and constitutional questions. 
A key example of this has been discussions in 
recent years regarding border changes between 
Serbia and Kosovo. These represent a major 
challenge to regional cooperation. The idea of 
TABLE VI.1  “Did you travel anywhere in the region in the past 12 months?” Percentage of 
respondents answering ‘yes’ by destination
Albania Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kosovo Montenegro North 
Macedonia
Serbia
Albania  3 14 7 7 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1  1 9 2 14
Kosovo 32 1  12 5 7
Montenegro 7 13 5  5 32
North Macedonia 15 3 13 10  13
Serbia 1 8 2 16 3  
Source: Balkan Barometer 2019.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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Are the incentives for the Western 
Balkan countries to cooperate more 
aligned than they used to be?
For two reasons, it is hard to make the case that 
all the Western Balkan countries have the same 
incentives to cooperate. First, two countries – 
Montenegro and North Macedonia – are not 
strongly involved in the geography of animosity. 
In theory, therefore, these two countries have 
a much quicker route to EU accession than the 
rest of the region. The Commission could help to 
prepare them for membership in the way it did for 
Bulgaria and Romania. Montenegro was moving 
closer to accession before facing internal turmoil 
in recent years, and North Macedonia was well on 
track to EU accession in the early 2000s before 
its name became a major issue. With serious EU 
support, both may now be able to get back on that 
track. 
connectivity outlined in the previous section, 
survey data suggests that the inhabitants of the 
Western Balkans are aware of and concerned 
about high-level political tensions. The Balkan 
Barometer survey for 2019 found that those 
who felt that regional relations were going in the 
wrong direction slightly outnumbered those who 
thought the opposite (Figure VI.3). This appears 
to have been strongly felt at the country level, 
especially in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Moreover, according to the Balkan Barometer, 
those dissatisfied with the security situation 
clearly outnumber those who are satisfied in four 
of the Western Baltic Six countries as well as in 
the region as a whole (Figure VI.4). In Albania 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the share of people 
either mostly or completely unsatisfied stands 
at 60 percent. Interestingly, Serbia is one of only 
two countries with net positive responses to the 
question. 
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FIGURE VI.4   “How satisfied are you with the overall security situation in your economy?” Percentage of total
Source: Balkan Barometer 2019. The survey takes into account crime, terrorism, uncontrolled migration and violent conflicts.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and wiiw.  |  Note: ‘Total satisfied’ = sum of ‘I’m completely satisfied’ and ‘I’m mostly satisfied’. ‘Total dissatisfied’ = sum of ‘I’m completely dissatisfied’ and ‘I’m 
mostly dissatisfied’. 
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strategy has been centred on getting Serbia to 
change its strategic commitments and prioritise 
Europeanisation over its territorial problems. 
However, Serbia’s leadership and populace are 
probably less interested in the EU now than at 
any time in the last 20 or so years. In fact, less 
than one-third of Serbia’s population thinks EU 
accession would be a ‘good thing’ (Figure VI.6), 
which makes Serbia quite an outlier on this issue 
in the region. 
From the political point of view of Serbians, and 
especially of political elites, EU membership 
can be seen as bringing more responsibilities 
and constraints than new benefits. This is 
certainly the case when taking into account the 
concessions that the EU would expect Serbia to 
make on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Serbia does not necessarily have an interest in 
fully committing to EU membership before its 
potential regional gains are exhausted or have 
proved to be illusory. Especially considering 
the fact that the EU (but also Russia and China) 
regard Serbia as the key to the region, Serbia 
The second key difference in terms of incentives, 
and the one that is more complicated, is the 
particular role of Serbia. As outlined in Chapters 
IV and V, the size of Serbia relative to the 
other Western Balkan countries, as well as its 
greater ability to forge economic and financial 
relationships outside the region, means that 
its incentives to engage in economic regional 
cooperation are not the same as for the others. 
It has more options than the other Western 
Balkan countries, and this is reflected in the fact 
that Serbia has integrated ever more strongly 
with the EU (but also with China and Russia) in 
recent years, often at the expense of integration 
with its fellow states in the region. Serbia’s share 
of the nominal GDP of the Western Balkan Six 
countries has not changed significantly over time 
(Figure VI.5). Over the past two decades, it has 
fluctuated between 80 and 100 percent of the 
combined GDP of the other five Western Balkan 
Six countries.
This matters a lot given Serbia’s central position 
in the geography of animosity. Much of the EU’s 
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FIGURE VI.5  Serbia’s nominal GDP, as a percentage of that of the other five Western Balkan Six countries combined
Source: wiiw.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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attractive, but those would have to be advertised 
quite specifically in order to elicit interest 
among affected stakeholders. It is not clear that 
this would be attractive enough, nor that an 
expansion of the EU budget to fully include the 
Western Balkans would be politically feasible 
from the EU side.
In this context, support for deeper EU integration 
in Serbia might have the best chances of emerging 
from the business community. The increased 
economic openness of the economies of the 
region in general and of Serbia in particular, 
and the fact that this has been achieved via 
integration with the EU, was supposed to 
encourage business interests to push strongly 
for EU integration. In turn, this was supposed to 
stimulate the political interests to adjust. But this 
has not happened yet. 
does not want to give up on Republika Srpska, 
Kosovo or even Montenegro. Therefore, Serbia 
does not have very strong incentives to engage 
in regional cooperation in order to secure EU 
membership. Meanwhile, as time goes on and 
Serbia becomes more economically entangled 
with China and Russia, its ability to meet the 
terms of the acquis and eventually join the EU will 
be negatively affected.
From the EU perspective, the question is how to 
change Serbia’s calculation of its incentives and, 
specifically, how to make Serbia an offer that 
is attractive enough to prompt a compromise 
on Kosovo, settle other disputes in the region, 
and prioritise European integration. First, there 
is the issue of access to EU labour markets, 
but visa liberalisation and special migration 
arrangements in countries like Austria and 
Germany have already made access to EU labour 
markets relative easy for Serbian citizens in any 
case. Second, transfers from the EU budget are 
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FIGURE VI.6   “Do you think EU membership would be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor bad thing for your 
economy?” Percentage of total
Source: Balkan Barometer 2019.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  |  Note SEE = average for Southeast Europe.
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general, led to a rapid expansion in the role of 
the state, which could also play into the hands of 
authoritarian rulers. 
In addition, we find that, over the past decade, 
improvements in governance in the Western 
Balkans have generally stalled or even gone into 
reverse relative to those in Western Europe. 
Using a simple average of four WGI scores – 
government effectiveness, rule of law, control 
of corruption, and regulatory quality – we see 
almost no improvement via-à-vis the German 
benchmark since 2008 (Figure VI.8). Over this 
period, we observe minor improvements in 
Albania, Montenegro and Serbia and minor 
declines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
North Macedonia. It should be said that this has 
largely been a CEE-wide phenomenon since the 
global financial crisis, most famously in Hungary 
and Poland among the EU countries. However, 
given the generally lower absolute levels for the 
Western Balkans than for the EU member states 
in CEE, it is more of an issue. 
Have governance challenges been 
overcome?
Governance standards have generally improved 
in the Western Balkans over the past two 
decades (Figure VI.7). According to the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) score for government effectiveness, most 
Western Balkan countries are 1.5 to 2 points 
below Germany (with scores ranging from +2.5 to 
-2.5). Apart from Kosovo, all countries improved 
relative to Germany between 2000 and 2018, 
and substantially so in the cases of Albania, North 
Macedonia and Serbia. All else being equal, this 
should make regional cooperation easier. 
However, recent events suggest that there is 
reason for caution here. First, animosity between 
and within countries – which, as we have shown, 
has increased in recent years – can provide a 
positive boost for autocrats. Second, the Covid-
19 pandemic has allowed emergency legislation 
to be introduced in many countries and, in 
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FIGURE VI.7  Worldwide Governance Indicators, government effectiveness score, distance to Germany, in points
Source: World Bank.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  |  Note: Outright scores on a scale of 2.5 (best) to –2.5 (worst).
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years, and while this has some potential positive 
spillovers (such as with respect to regional 
connectivity), China’s involvement also creates 
risks. Russia’s role is also important, at least with 
respect to Serbia, where it can exert influence via, 
for example, the oil company NIS.
The influence of Russia and China in the 
region does not necessarily hamstring regional 
cooperation efforts. However, the economic 
presence of both, and especially China’s growing 
role, create the potential for conflict with the EU 
acquis, as we outlined in Chapter V. Over time, 
this could have negative knock-on effects for the 
EU accession prospects of the Western Balkan 
Six countries.
What is the role of outside actors 
now?
More than 20 years after the end of the war 
in Kosovo, the EU and US roles in the Western 
Balkans remain central. Both have accumulated 
huge responsibilities over these years. A great 
deal of governance in the region depends on 
the almost daily involvement of the EU, US and 
NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, in 
particular, cannot be run without the persistent 
involvement of these external actors and, in both 
cases, this naturally also means that there is 
intense interaction with Serbia. Basic stability – in 
not only a security sense, but also economic and 
financial senses – is more or less underpinned by 
the EU and the US. 
Other important external actors are also active 
in the Western Balkans. We have shown that the 
economic role of China has increased over recent 
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FIGURE VI.8  Average of four Worldwide Governance Indicator scores, differential vis-à-vis Germany, in points
Source: World Bank.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  
Note: Outright scores on a scale of 2.5 (best) to –2.5 (worst). EU-SEE = simple average of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. 
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A third advantage is increased market power. 
Members of a customs union can combine their 
market size and thereby increase their power 
in relation to third parties. They can use this to 
support a domestic industry. 
Fourth, customs unions can help to dilute the 
influence of powerful and entrenched interest 
groups by removing country-specific protections 
and forcing firms to compete in a more open 
market (Panagariya and Findlay 1996). This could 
be relevant for the Western Balkans, where 
powerful interest groups are often entrenched 
and able to rent seek (see e.g. Bechev 2012 and 
van Ham 2014).
Meanwhile, a single market would go much 
further than a free trade agreement or customs 
union by adding services, capital and labour. It can 
also do much more than a customs union in terms 
of reducing border delays and costs. In addition, 
a single market including capital markets 
and digital integration could have important 
positive spillovers. There are currently quite 
underdeveloped areas in the region. In theory, the 
creation of a single larger market in these areas 
could provide a significant boost to economic 
development. 
Relative to the size of their economies, the 
Western Balkan countries are very reliant 
on foreign capital inflows (Figure VI.9). This 
is particularly the case in terms of secondary 
income credit (a rough proxy for remittances). 
FDI inflows have also been more significant, 
at least for Albania and Montenegro. Portfolio 
flows, meanwhile, play a very small role in the 
overall external financing profile, reflecting 
underdeveloped regional capital markets and 
a lack of instruments to interest international 
investors. 
Underdeveloped regional capital markets are 
a serious barrier to growth (Moder and Bonifai 
2017). In general, the region faces substantially 
higher real interest rates compared with both 
What are the next steps for regional 
cooperation in an economic sense?
The two key initiatives related to deepening 
regional cooperation in an economic sense 
are the Regional Economic Area and ‘mini-
Schengen’ outlined in Chapter IV. In both cases, 
the question of overlapping priorities in terms 
of economic development and the scope for 
policy coordination becomes more important. 
Taking economic integration to the next level, as 
envisaged in these plans, will require much closer 
coordination of economic policy than in the past. 
Two concrete aspects of this tighter economic 
integration are a customs union and a single 
market in the Western Balkans. Both are worth 
considering in terms of the different incentives 
and priorities for economic development that the 
Western Balkan countries have and the potential 
contributions that a deeper form of regional 
cooperation can make to reconciliation.
There are numerous potential advantages to 
a customs union. First, a customs union can 
increase cross-border trade. It can significantly 
cut costs and time lost at borders between 
the parties to the agreement, lower prices and 
increase choice for consumers, translate into 
lower business costs for firms, and lead to higher 
competitiveness for participating countries.
Second, a customs union can increase FDI inflows. 
By increasing the size of the region in which goods 
could move more freely than under a simple FTA 
(e.g. by reducing or eliminating border checks 
and the costs to moving goods across a border), 
a region can become more attractive to foreign 
investors. In the case of the Western Balkans, in 
terms of population, the region is roughly the size 
of Romania, but with a lot of internal borders. 
This has especially proved to be a problem for 
infrastructure investments, which in turn has 
stood in the way of large-scale investments in 
manufacturing and energy, in particular. A customs 
union could help eliminate these obstacles.
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countries is really big enough to attract the 
interest of private equity firms. A capital markets 
union in the region could be important in this 
regard. The EBRD, OECD and others have 
recommended regional cooperation in order to 
support SME development, including in terms 
of access to financing. Scaling-up the market 
could significantly increase the interest of non-
FDI foreign capital in the region, which would be 
helpful for smaller firms. 
Policymakers around the world have become more 
focused on digitalisation in recent years. It is clear 
that digital topics will be increasingly important 
in the future, not least in the Western Balkans. 
Having recognised this, the European Commission 
launched its Digital Agenda for the Western 
Balkans in 2018. Digital integration in the Western 
Balkans is a key focus of the Regional Cooperation 
Council. Digitalisation in the economy in general is 
EU-CEE countries (including the 2007 joiners) 
and other non-EU CEE countries (Figure VI.10). 
Most small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in the Western Balkans – and especially the 
more innovative SMEs with significant growth 
potential – have very limited access to financing 
(ibid.). Their sole option, in effect, is commercial 
banks. However, the fact that many of the most 
innovative companies are in the ICT sector means 
that most of their assets are ‘intangible’. In other 
words, they cannot post significant collateral, 
which is a big problem for traditional banks 
(Haskel and Westlake 2017). On the other hand, 
private equity firms, which are an important 
source of capital for these kinds of firms in the 
US and parts of Western Europe, still have a very 
limited presence in the Western Balkans. 
One of the issues for the Western Balkans 
in this regard is simply scale, as none of the 
5
10
15
20
25
30
BulgariaCroatiaRomaniaKosovoMontenegroNorth 
Macedonia
AlbaniaBosnia and 
Herzegovina
Serbia
Portfolio investment liabilitiesDirect investment liabilitiesSecondary income credit
Other investment liabilities
–5
0
FIGURE VI.9  Selected capital inflows, as a percentage of GDP, 2010–2019 average
Source: wiiw.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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Balkans are already quite far behind most of 
their peers in CEE in terms of preparing for the 
digital economy of the future (Figure VI.11). The 
average score for the Western Balkan countries  
is considerably lower than that of the 2004 EU 
joiners in CEE as well as below the averages for 
the 2007–2013 EU joiners, the CIS, Turkey and 
Ukraine.32
Significant progress on digitalisation could have 
important and positive impacts on regional 
integration (ibid.). Directly, this could involve 
cross-border e-governance cooperation and 
facilitate cross-border business clusters. If pursued 
successfully, these developments could also have 
important spillovers for regional cooperation 
more generally, such as improving contacts among 
citizens of different Western Balkan countries. 
32 Kosovo and Montenegro are not included in the survey. 
likely to get a significant push from the Covid-19 
pandemic and its fallout. 
In theory, digital integration can proceed 
more easily than, say, energy or infrastructure 
integration. Since it does not require as 
much physical infrastructure, it may offer an 
opportunity for less developed economies to 
catch up more quickly. In the case of the Western 
Balkans, progress on regional digitalisation 
could act as a driver of economic and social 
convergence with the EU (Barbić et al. 2018).
However, the 2019 update of the Network 
Readiness Index31 suggests that the Western 
31 The Network Readiness Index 2019 ranked 121 countries 
on their ability to use information and communication 
technology to achieve inclusive and sustainable growth, 
competitiveness and well-being. It assesses countries based 
on four main criteria: technology, people, governance and 
impact.
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40 percent of the German level on this basis. The 
old problem remains: These are small, relatively 
poor economies right next to a huge and very 
wealthy economic bloc. Despite a multitude of 
initiatives outlined in Chapter VI, most Western 
Balkan countries still do the vast majority of 
their trade outside the region. The economic 
relationship with the EU has largely remained in a 
‘hub and spoke’ model. 
A second challenge is connectivity, which is 
important for increased regional trade and 
investment flows. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the current state of regional transport 
and energy connectivity is better than it 
was 20 years ago, but it still has some major 
shortcomings. Various initiatives of recent years 
have the potential to improve this, but there isn’t 
any game changer in sight. 
When it comes to greater regional 
economic integration, are the 
potential economic upsides greater 
and the barriers lower than they 
were before?
Despite the potential positives outlined above, 
the creation of a customs union and/or single 
market in the Western Balkans is likely to run into 
the familiar practical difficulties and challenges 
of economic integration of the past. These 
challenges can be split into six key areas. 
First, the economic upside of region cooperation 
remains very limited. As of 2018 (the last year for 
which fully comparable data are available), the 
combined nominal GDP of the Western Balkan 
Six was 2.8 percent of that of Germany and 0.6 
percent of that of the EU28. As of 2018, none of 
the Western Balkan Six countries had risen above 
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are still necessary in order to implement rules of 
origin, which causes the border delays mentioned 
above. 
Moreover, as outlined in Chapter V, the size, 
sophistication and international integration of 
Serbia’s export sector (and particularly those of 
the automotive sector) dwarf anything else in the 
region. In this sector, Serbia mostly trades with 
the EU rather than the rest of the region, and very 
little of a regional value chain has developed. At 
the opposite end of the scale, Montenegro has 
almost no manufacturing industry to speak of; 
it accounts for just 4 percent of GDP compared 
with around 15 percent for Serbia. This means 
that Serbia would have quite different incentives 
in terms of setting a common external tariff 
related to automotive supply chains than most or 
all other countries in the Western Balkans. 
Sixth, Western Balkan countries have existing 
FTAs with partners outside the region (Table 
VI.1). The most problematic of these would 
probably be Serbia’s FTA with Russia, which 
has been in place since 2000. Serbia recently 
expanded this by signing a deal with the whole 
of the Eurasian Economic Union. Serbia’s strong 
political relationship with Russia would make this 
Third, the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic 
fallout will also represent a rather severe 
challenge to the economies of the Western 
Balkans, and the global economic backdrop is 
extremely challenging. The IMF expects that 
2020 will be the worst year for the global 
economy since the 1930s, and that certain 
countries which are particularly important to the 
Western Balkan countries (e.g. Croatia and Italy) 
will be particularly badly affected.
Fourth, further steps towards regional economic 
integration will require a greater harmonisation of 
legislation and regulations as well as more policy 
coordination. This will be difficult to achieve in 
light of the low level of trust between the partners 
and the low government standards outlined in 
Chapter IV. The challenges to policy coordination 
outlined in Chapter V are still in place. 
Fifth, there would be the challenge of reaching 
agreement on a common external tariff for the 
regional customs union. At present, Western 
Balkan countries’ tariffs with the rest of the world 
differ, which necessitates border controls within 
the region. Even though intra-CEFTA trade in 
goods and (increasingly) services is tariff-free and 
liberalised in most other respects, border checks 
TABLE VI.2  Western Balkan countries’ FTAs
Partner Albania Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kosovo Montenegro North 
Macedonia
Serbia
CEFTA x x x x x x
EU x x x x x x
Russia    x  x
US x x x x x x
Turkey x x x x x x
EFTA x x  x  x
Kazakhstan      x
Belarus      x
Ukraine    x x  
Sources: National sources.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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North Macedonia and Serbia to a certain extent 
– negative demographic trends can be partly 
explained by low birthrates. However, a key 
factor for all Western Balkan countries is a high 
rate of outward migration (Mara 2020). 
Although outward migration from most of the 
Western Balkan countries was strong before 
1989, it has grown even stronger over the 
last three decades. An estimated 1.6 million 
Bosnians lived abroad in 2017, or almost half 
of the country’s population. However, for all 
Western Balkan countries for which such data are 
available, the number of people who have left is 
a significant share of the total population (Figure 
VI.12). 
The high rates of outward migration can be 
interpreted as a reaction to various factors, 
including the quality of public services, 
governance standards and perceptions regarding 
corruption and nepotism (Judah 2019). However, 
it is likely that weak economic performance and 
difficult to give up. Of course, it may well do this 
eventually to join the EU, but probably not for the 
sake of a Western Balkans customs union. 
How big are the demographic 
challenges that the region faces?
As alluded to in the introduction to this study, 
the macroeconomic performance of the Western 
Balkan countries over the last two decades has been 
far from impressive. The region’s economies have 
generally recorded the weakest rates of per capita 
GDP convergence with Germany in the whole of 
CEE over the last 20 years. This is despite the fact 
that the Western Balkan countries started out in 
2000 much poorer than almost all of the countries 
in the region that have subsequently joined the EU. 
Negative demographic trends have been both a 
cause and a consequence of this disappointing 
economic performance. In some countries – 
especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also 
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FIGURE VI.12  Total emigrants as a share of current population, in percent
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Over the coming years and decades, the 
demographic challenges faced by the Western 
Balkans are only likely to increase. Moreover, 
it is likely to be younger and more educated 
people, in particular, who leave since they have 
the best opportunities to find work in Western 
Europe. This will create special challenges for the 
economies of the region, especially in sectors in 
which there are already severe shortages in some 
countries, such as in healthcare. In its ‘constant 
natural population development’ scenario,34 the 
UN projects that the working-age population of 
the Western Balkan countries will decline by 15 
to 35 percent by 2050, depending on the country 
(Figure VI.15). Even in a (quite unrealistic) ‘zero 
migration’ scenario, the decline would still be 
notable across the board. 
34 This scenario assumes that current fertility, mortality and net 
migration rates will continue. For a full explanation, see Mara 
(2020). 
poor job prospects also play an important role. 
Since 2007, the average unemployment rate in 
Western Balkan countries has been considerably 
higher than in the EU member states in CEE 
(Figure VI.13). 
Available survey data indicate that high rates 
of outward migration are likely to continue. 
The Balkan Barometer in 2019 showed that 39 
percent of people in the Western Balkans would 
consider living and working abroad (Figure VI.14). 
Country-specific responses ranged from 31 
percent in Montenegro to 50 percent in Albania. 
Among those considering moving abroad, 25 
percent were ‘actively getting informed about 
possibilities’ and a further 12 percent were 
already at a more advanced stage.33
33 This is a combination of those reviewing and applying for jobs 
(6%), those already with concrete plans to move (4%), and 
those who knew the exact date of departure (2%). 
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The example of the 2004 EU joiners
For CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 (EU-
CEE8),35 we find that their trade integration with 
each other actually increased quite significantly 
after EU accession. Moreover, and interestingly, 
we find that the EU-CEE8 countries integrated 
more with each other after EU accession than 
with the EU15; in fact, 2004 marked quite a 
significant change in this trend (Figure VII.1). 
This is perhaps a surprising finding, as one could 
expect that the entry into the EU Customs Union 
and single market, combined with the fact that 
the EU15 was a much bigger and wealthier 
market, would mean that the opposite would 
occur. 
We attribute this to two linked factors, both 
of which are highly relevant to the Western 
Balkans. First, EU accession brought about 
truly ‘frictionless’ trade. Second, EU accession 
introduced a significant positive demand shock in 
the EU-CEE8 economies. Although much of this 
was reflected in increased export demand, Figure 
VII.1 indicates that this was not the only thing 
going on, as a great deal of the extra demand 
came in the form of capital flows. These capital 
inflows came from various sources, but most 
significantly from FDI and EU budget inflows. 
Beginning in around 1998 (which was roughly 
the start of EU accession negotiations for the EU-
CEE8 countries), FDI started to flood into the 
35 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
If the potential for further intraregional trade and 
investment is low and will additionally require the 
expenditure of a lot of political capital, perhaps 
it would instead be better to focus on greater 
integration with the EU, as was suggested by 
some two decades ago. The most obvious point 
to make here is that the potential upside of 
further economic integration with the EU – in 
terms of trade and investment – dwarfs even the 
most optimistic expectations about what greater 
regional integration could potentially achieve. 
The combined GDP of the Western Balkans is 
roughly equal to that of Slovakia, or less than 
1 percent of that of the EU28. The disparity 
in size means that even a limited amount of 
further integration with the EU would surely be 
much more powerful in economic terms than 
a substantial increase in regional economic 
integration. 
In this section, we will look at the example of the 
CEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 
how this impacted their economic integration. 
We will also look at various existing examples of 
deeper economic integration with the EU and ask 
to what extent these would be both feasible and 
desirable steps for the Western Balkans. 
VII. Another way? ‘EU integration max’
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income on average in the eight countries (and 
increased significantly after that; see Figure IV.6 
above). As well as being positive for aggregate 
demand in general, this was (and continues to 
be) important for infrastructure investment, 
in particular. In fact, EU funds have financed 
the majority of public infrastructure in these 
countries since 2004. This, in turn, has created a 
positive feedback loop, as better infrastructure 
enables the EU-CEE8 to develop increasingly 
sophisticated economic structures (e.g. ‘just-
in-time’ manufacturing) and acts as a powerful 
incentive for foreign investors to put their money 
in these countries. 
It is true that the Western Balkans already have 
a high level of economic integration with the 
EU. The SAAs already provide for free trade 
in goods as well as quite liberalised conditions 
for investment. Nevertheless, there are more 
steps that could be taken to integrate the region 
with the EU market. This, in turn, could be an 
important driver of regional cooperation. 
region (Figure VII.2). On average across the eight 
countries, net FDI inflows averaged 5.4 percent of 
GDP between 1998 and 2007. The share coming 
from the EU15 was, on average, consistently 
around three-quarters during this time, ranging 
from about half in Latvia to almost 85 percent in 
the Czech Republic and Estonia (averages for the 
2000–2007 period). It is reasonable to expect 
that these inflows were greatly influenced by two 
things: first, expectations of future frictionless 
trade between the EU-CEE8 countries and the 
home markets of FDI, such as Austria, Germany 
and Italy (Buch and Piazolo 2000);36 and, second, 
the strong and credible reform anchor of the 
EU and NATO accession processes (which is 
something very important to foreign investors). 
Meanwhile, the EU-CEE8 countries were also 
given access to the EU budget. From 2004 
to 2008, net inflows from the budget were 
equivalent to around 1 percent of gross national 
36 One important caveat is that this was quite a special time for 
the global economy, and one that is not likely to be repeated. 
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FIGURE VII.1  External trade of EU-CEE8 countries, 2004 = 100
Source: wiiw.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.
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of Hungary, despite evidence of corruption there 
(Gebrekidan, Apuzzo and Novak 2019). 
In addition to being a game changer in the 
region, including the Western Balkans in the 
EU budget would also hardly register (fiscally) 
in the EU itself. Using 2018 data, we come up 
with a rough estimate of what full Western 
Balkan participation in the EU budget would 
cost. Assuming the highest-possible rate of net 
income from the budget (Hungary’s level of 4 
percent of GNI on average over the most recent 
five years for which data are available), we find 
that the impact on the net contributors to the EU 
budget would be almost imperceptible (Figure 
VII.4), ranging from 0.009 percent of 2017 GNI in 
Ireland to 0.04 percent in Germany. 
Access to the EU budget
For the Western Balkan countries, full 
involvement in the EU budget would be hugely 
beneficial. For most of EU-CEE, EU funds are 
equivalent to 2 to 5 percent of gross national 
income (GNI) per year (Figure VII.3). Between 
2014 and 2018, Hungary and Bulgaria received 
on average the equivalent of 4 percent of GNI 
per year in net terms, while the analogous 
Figures were 3.2 percent for Lithuania, 2.8 
percent for Latvia, and 2.7 percent for Romania. 
Compounded over time, this has been something 
of a game changer for the infrastructure of these 
countries. EU funds tend to account for the 
majority of public infrastructure investment in 
the EU-CEE in addition to being a major reason 
(and probably the major reason) why EU-CEE 
countries tend to have significantly better 
infrastructure than Western Balkan countries. 
Although one could argue that weak governance 
would reduce the effectiveness of EU funds, this 
does not seem to have been decisive in the case 
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FIGURE VII.2  Inward FDI inflows, as a percentage of GDP, EU-CEE8 average
Source: wiiw FDI Database.  |  © Bertelsmann Stiftung and wiiw.  |  Note: EU-CEE8 = Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, 
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Deeper services and labour 
integration
Services are an important part of all Western 
Balkan economies and a key generator of 
foreign currency. All six countries run services 
surpluses, and these have generally increased 
relative to the size of their economies over the 
past decade (Figure VII.5). Montenegro’s (and, to 
a lesser extent, Albania’s) specialism in tourism 
is well known, but the service sector in the 
region is much broader than this, including and 
increasingly in IT and digital services.
Expanding the current SAAs to include services 
could be feasible and possibly not present 
huge obstacles. In this case, the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
with Ukraine is an instructive example (Adarov 
and Havlik 2016). This currently offers the highest 
level of integration with the EU apart from the 
EEA and EFTA (discussed below). DCFTAs provide 
for a high level of integration of goods, services 
and capital, although not of people (Emerson et al. 
2017). Among other things, this indicates that the 
‘four freedoms’ can be divisible in certain cases. 
Introducing fully free movement of labour 
between the EU and the Western Balkans could 
be an altogether trickier issue, as one can assume 
that the population of many or most EU countries 
would be against it. In any case, this could be 
postponed for some time, as was the case during 
the enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013. 
However, in reality, opposition from the public in 
EU member states may not be as high as feared. 
For example, of the questions on EU policies 
asked by Eurobarometer, free movement receives 
the highest degree of support (Figure III.2 
above). This does not include the Western Balkan 
countries, of course, but it is not obvious why EU 
citizens would be so supportive of free movement 
with, say, Romania and not with, say, Serbia. In 
fact, one could even expect to see quite strong 
business lobbying for this. Since 2015, citizens 
of the Western Balkans have been able to enter 
Partial entry into other parts of 
the EU Customs Union and single 
market
Membership in the EU Customs Union would 
be an important deepening of the economic 
relationship between the bloc and the Western 
Balkans. If the Western Balkans entered the EU 
Customs Union, this would mean two main things: 
First, they would adopt the customs regime of 
the EU, including its external tariffs. Among 
other things, this would resolve the problem 
of the Western Balkan countries’ arguing over 
external tariffs, as they would simply adopt those 
of the EU. Accession to the EU Customs Union 
would therefore prove to be a powerful driver of 
regional economic integration. 
Second, membership in the EU Customs Union 
would mean the removal of non-tariff barriers to 
trade with the EU. Although Turkey’s membership 
in the customs union for goods traded with the 
EU has not faced many practical difficulties in this 
respect (Hakura 2018), there are some important 
differences compared to the Western Balkans. 
First, the Western Balkan countries are on their 
way to eventual EU membership, which Turkey 
is not. This would make any Western Balkan 
participation in the EU Customs Union smoother 
than has been the case for Turkey (especially in 
the case of Montenegro and Serbia, which are 
already in the accession process). Second, size is 
also important. Both in terms of population and 
economic output, the Western Balkans region is 
small compared with Turkey, so it would be much 
easier for the EU to integrate. Third, Turkey faces 
(and will continue to face) visa barriers, whereas 
all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo 
already have visa-free access to the Schengen 
Area.37 
37 At the time of writing, this is still the case for Kosovo.
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There are several important differences between 
what Norway or Switzerland have and full EU 
membership, with the most important being 
their non-membership in the EU Customs Union. 
Norway is also outside the Common Fisheries 
Policy and Common Agricultural Policy, which 
reflects the importance of these industries to its 
economy. 
Both countries have had issues regarding their 
arrangements with the EU. Switzerland is a 
particularly tricky case because its membership 
is based on a large number of bilateral treaties, 
which creates a high level of complexity. This is 
certainly not something that will be offered to the 
Western Balkans. On the other hand, Norway’s 
relationship with the EU is generally smoother, 
but the need to open its postal services and 
electricity companies has caused some friction. 
One could certainly anticipate similar issues in 
the Western Balkans. In both cases, unlimited 
immigration into the Schengen Area could be 
Germany on working visas provided they have a 
concrete employment offer. More recently, amid 
labour shortages in Germany and other parts of 
Western Europe, there have been more initiatives 
to make it easier for people from the Western 
Balkans to work there. 
Partial entry into the single market: 
The examples of Norway and 
Switzerland
Switzerland and Norway (along with Iceland 
and Lichtenstein) are members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), which gives them 
access to the single market. However, neither is 
a member of the EU Customs Union. Norway is a 
member of the European Economic Area (EEA), 
but Switzerland is not. One can view the EFTA 
as a kind of outer ring of the EU. This could be 
one possible route for the Western Balkans to 
integrate with the EU. 
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an issue. However, in this regard, the case of the 
Western Balkans would be very different, as the 
region would be a source rather than recipient of 
migrants from the rest of the EU. 
This links to a more general and fairly basic 
difference: While Norway and Switzerland do not 
want to be part of the EU, the Western Balkan 
countries do. This means that the exceptions of 
Norway and Switzerland, or deviation from full 
EU membership, are to suit the priorities of and 
placate public opinion in those countries rather 
than in the EU. In the case of the Western Balkans 
and the EU, the relationship would be the other 
way round. Just because there is opposition in 
some parts of the EU to allowing the Western 
Balkans full membership, this does not mean that 
there would be an automatic block to adding the 
region to parts of the single market. 
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•  Current proposals for deepening regional 
cooperation in an economic sense are fine, 
but they will not fundamentally change 
the situation and are likely to run into the 
familiar obstacles of the past.
•  Governance standards are very low and 
regressing in at least some cases, which in 
itself will hamper additional efforts towards 
regional cooperation and the EU accession 
process.
•  Local ownership of the process of regional 
cooperation has increased, and citizens feel 
engaged. However, elites are less interested, 
and the territorial disputes and constitutional 
gridlock of 2020 is the same as that of 2000.
•  The EU and the US underpin basic political, 
economic and financial stability in the 
Western Balkans.
•  North Macedonia and Montenegro can 
feasibly join the EU in the coming years, 
but politics will prevent the remaining four 
countries in the Western Balkan Six from 
doing so. The sense of drift risks putting more 
roadblocks in the way of EU accession for 
these four countries. 
By summarising in this way, we do not want to 
imply that regional cooperation in the economic 
sphere has been a waste of time. Rather, as we 
showed in Chapter VI, it has clearly had a positive 
impact on intraregional trade and investment as 
As we have shown in Chapters V–VI, the 
challenges outlined at the start of this study 
remain largely the same 20 years on and, in 
some ways, the situation has become even more 
challenging:
•  Intraregional trade and investment 
relationships within the Western Balkans 
have deepened in the last 20 years, and 
intraregional infrastructure connectivity has 
improved. 
•  However, this has not delivered much 
economic convergence with the rest of 
Europe, and the quality of infrastructure 
remains generally well below the levels of 
those in EU-CEE countries.
•  For most countries in the Western Balkans, 
the key trading partner and sources of FDI is 
the EU.
•  The efforts towards regional cooperation 
have not had any material impact on the 
most intractable aspects of the geography of 
animosity, and EU accession for the region 
still appears to be many years off.
•  The economic upside of additional efforts 
towards regional cooperation is likely to 
be limited and not attractive enough to 
get leaders in the Western Balkans to fully 
embrace them.
VIII. Conclusions and the way forward
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Balkan countries will bring positive benefits. 
Greater integration into capital markets and the 
digital sphere are very welcome, not least in the 
current environment, when the economic shock 
from the Covid-19 pandemic will put particular 
pressure on SMEs and lead to opportunities 
in the digital economy. All of this would surely 
increase the region’s ability to attract bigger and 
higher-quality FDI projects, a form of economic 
development that has worked reasonably well for 
other parts of CEE. It would also increase the size 
and power of the business community pushing for 
EU accession. 
However, these efforts alone are not going to 
overcome the fundamental barriers to economic 
integration, economic development, political 
normalisation and eventually EU accession 
for most of the countries of the Western 
Balkans. There is a clear risk that pushing 
hard for greater regional cooperation would 
be ‘pushing on a string’, so to speak. In other 
words, it could require major efforts and a large 
investment of political capital as well as create 
a lot of expectations, but then only result in 
a few tangible rewards as well as subsequent 
disappointment and frustration. 
As outlined in Chapter V, a greater level of 
economic integration with the EU than the 
Western Balkan region currently has is both 
possible and desirable. The Western Balkan 
countries could get greater access to the EU 
budget without any significant increase in 
expenditure for any member state given the 
size and wealth level of the Western Balkan 
economies relative to those of the EU. This 
would particularly be important for public 
infrastructure funding, and have the added bonus 
of reducing the temptation for Western Balkan 
countries to turn to China. Moreover, by itself, 
greater integration with the EU market could 
actually spur regional integration, seeing that 
trade integration between the Visegrad countries 
increased substantially after EU accession.
well as on infrastructure connectivity. Moreover, 
our paper does not intend to challenge the 
political, social and youth aspects of regional 
cooperation, as it is undoubtedly good that there 
is youth cooperation, military/police contact, 
and a general normalisation of relations after 
what are still quite recent wars. Indeed, all of 
this should continue, and the increased local 
ownership of the process has undoubtedly been  
a positive step. 
However, as we have also shown in this 
paper, these efforts alone are not enough to 
fundamentally drive stronger regional economic 
integration and development and, in turn, to 
change the geography of animosity. They may 
have been necessary, but they are far from 
sufficient. The two main challenges of the year 
2000 – territorial/constitutional disputes and 
a low level of economic development relative 
to most of the rest of Europe – remain the 
challenges of 2020. This has been exacerbated 
by demographic challenges, with strong outward 
migration over many years causing shortages of 
skilled labour in key sectors, which further weighs 
on the economic outlook for the region. Survey 
data suggest that the strong outward migration 
and brain drain of the last few decades are set 
to continue in the future, and that the Western 
Balkan region faces quite an alarming decline in 
the size of its working-age population between 
now and 2050.
The question, then, is not whether regional 
cooperation has had a positive impact and will 
continue to; it has, and it will. A more important 
question is whether the gains have really 
justified the time and political capital spent on 
this initiative, and whether this approach is the 
best way to achieve what must still be the end 
goals: political normalisation within the Western 
Balkans and full EU accession for all countries. 
Pushing further economic regional cooperation 
from this point is not without its merits. Reducing 
trade-related friction between the Western 
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the region. If this does not happen, Serbia will be 
incentivised to continue to extract concessions 
from the EU and other external players, and the 
EU accession process for most of the region will 
be stalled. 
In this sense, the phased integration approach 
being advocated by France could be engaged with 
constructively. For example, it would be better 
to have more access to the EU budget and other 
benefits of membership earlier in the accession 
process than to do all the hard work upfront and 
only receive rewards at the end. 
However, economic aspects can ultimately only 
be part of the solution for the Western Balkans. 
As in the past, the political aspects are central 
and, in this sense, the old dilemma of the ‘Balkan 
express’ versus the ‘Balkan regatta’ is still there. 
In other words, is it better to bring the less 
‘problematic’ countries in first? Or is it better to 
try to bring all countries into the EU at the same 
time? In both cases, regional cooperation and 
integration make up important elements, but they 
are far from sufficient by themselves.
There is a quicker route for Montenegro and 
North Macedonia into the EU than for the rest 
of the region. These two countries are not as 
strongly involved in the geography of animosity 
as the other four. With strong Commission 
support, as happened with Romania and Bulgaria, 
relatively swift EU accession for Montenegro 
and North Macedonia is feasible. In turn, it 
could be hoped that accession for these two 
countries could boost pro-EU forces in Serbia. 
This would be helped by the deepening of the 
regional market and higher FDI outlined above, 
which would increase the size and power of the 
business constituency that supports regional and 
European integration. 
By contrast, bringing all of the Western Balkan 
Six countries into the EU at the same time is 
a much tougher proposition. Doing so would 
require a combination of strong pressure on 
and serious incentives to Serbia to make the 
required compromises regarding Kosovo in 
addition to a change in the stances of some 
current EU member states that oppose Kosovan 
independence. It would also mean a much harder 
push for improved governance standards across 
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In the early 2000s, following the end of the 
Yugoslav Wars, the Bertelsmann Stiftung in 
cooperation with Germany‘s Federal Foreign Office 
explored strategies for regional reconciliation and 
peacebuilding within the framework of the so-
called “Balkan Forums”. Particular attention was 
paid to the opportunities for regional cooperation 
to bring peace to the Western Balkans. Twenty 
years later, while much progress has been 
made, the desired deepening of cooperation as 
an essential prerequisite for peaceful conflict 
resolution has not been fully achieved. The 25th 
anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica in July 
2020 served as a reminder not only of the violence 
of the 1990s, but also of the fact that most of these 
conflicts have been merely frozen rather than 
constructively dealt with through new forms of 
cooperation between the Western Balkan states.
The question therefore arose as to whether 
the EU strategy of regional cooperation for the 
Western Balkans was the right one at all, and 
what else could or should have been done to 
make more progress. In the Vienna Institute 
for International Economic Studies (wiiw), we 
found an excellent partner for examining the 
economic aspect of regional cooperation and 
whether the Western Balkans actually fulfilled 
the requirements for such a strategy. 
During the initial scoping of this study, 
discussions took place in Brussels attended by 
representatives of DG TRADE, DG NEAR, the 
European Parliament, the European Political 
Strategy Centre (EPSC), EEAS and the German 
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